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VALUATION ISSUES IN APPLYING 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LAW TO 
LEVERAGED BUYOUTSt 
ALEMANTE G. SELASSIE* 
INTRODUCTION 
A leveraged buyout1 ("LBO") is a purchase transaction in which 
an acquiring entity purchases a business ("Target") largely through 
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Thomas, and Nancy McDonough for typing numerous revisions. Above all, I would like to 
thank my wife, Askale, who, as always, gave deeply of herself to carry on through· this work. 
1 In the typical leveraged buyout ("LBO"), the acquiring entity, a group of investors 
and managers, forms a wholly owned shell corporation. It then borrows the necessary funds 
required for the acquisition from a lending institution, giving the lender an unsecured note. 
It uses the funds to acquire Target's stock from the selling shareholders. Once it assumes 
control, it causes Target to guarantee its note to lender and to secure that obligation by 
granting a lien on Target's assets. 
LBOs have attracted extensive criticism on various public policy grounds. Some critics 
find such transactions troubling because they benefit the new owners of Target at the expense 
of the federal treasury. LBOs offer tax benefits in the form of increased depreciation 
deductions as well as the deductions of interest payments on debt. See generally Canellos, The 
Over-leveraged Acquisition, 39 Tax Law. 91 (1985); Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 730, 759-64 (1985). See Marcis, Leveraged Buyouts: Federal Income Tax Comideratiom, 
in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS 175 (Y. Amihud ed. 1989) for a discussion of additional 
tax advantages. See also Cieri, Heiman, Henze II, Jenks, Kirschner, Riley & Sullivan, An 
Introduction to Legal and Practical Comideratiom in the Restructuring of Leveraged Buyouts, 45 Bus. 
LAw 333, 368-76 (1989) [hereinafter Cieri, Leveraged Buyouts] for a discussion of additional 
tax consequences. 
Another criticism focuses on the unfairness of the price paid to selling shareholders. See 
Lowenstein, supra at 740; see also Comment, Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public 
Shareholder and Enhance the Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U.L. REv. 489, 492-93 (1986). But see 
Booth, Management Buyouts, Slw.reholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 60 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 630, 634-38 (1985) (contending that the acquisition price is determined by an efficient 
market). Although LBOs have generated substantial values for shareholders, averaging a 
premium of between 30% to 40% over market price, critics are not satisfied that shareholders 
are fairly compensated. See Markey, Legislative Views on Management Buyouts, in LEVERAGED 
MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, supra at 211. 
A related fairness issue concerns the effect of an LBO on the rights of bondholders. 
Some have indicated that the relatively high premiums paid to shareholders comes at the 
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borrowed funds. 2 There are several ways to structure an LB0.3 
However structured, all LBO transactions share two common char-
acteristics. First, most if not all the borrowed funds are used to pay 
the selling shareholders. Consequently, when the dust settles and 
the buyout is complete, Target will have received little to none of 
those funds. Second, Target's assets indirectly finance the acquisi-
tion because they secure the loan extended to acquire Target. Thus, 
an LBO's effect is to substitute a significant amount of secured debt 
in the place of equity in Target's capital structure. 
Although for investors an LBO may prove to be the "kiss which 
turns a frog into a handsome prince,"4 it pits the lender's5 interests 
expense of existing bondholders. See, e.g., McDaniel, Blmdholders and Corporate Gcniernance, 41 
Bus. LAw. 413, 414 (1986). 
A final concern relates to the overleveraging of corporate America and its consequences. 
In 1984, John Shad, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, warned 
more and more leverage would lead to more and more bankruptcies. John S.R. Shad, The 
Leveraging of America, statement before the New York Financial Writers Association (June 
7, 1984), quoted in CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, 
CoNSUMER PROTECTION AND FIN. oF THE HousE CoMM. ON ENERGY AND CoMMERCE, 98TH 
CoNG., 2D SESs., MERGER ACTIVITY AND LEVERAGED BuYOUTs: SouND CoRPORATE RESTRuc-
TURING oR WALL STREET ALcHEMY? 5 (Comm. Print 1984). 
2 "Acquiring entity" refers to one or more individuals or to specialized financial orga-
nizations that sponsor LBO transactions. See Anderson, Defining the Game Board in LEVERAGED 
BuYOUTS 11, 14-15 (S.C. Diamond ed. 1985). The best known of the latter is Kohlberg, 
Kravis, Roberts & ~o. which, in 1988, won the largest ever LBO bid ($25 billion) for RJR 
Nabisco Inc. See Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1988, at AI, col. 6. 
s For a discussion of the six most common LBO structures, see Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts 
in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REv. 73, 80-83 (1985). See also Bernstein, Leveraged Buyouts: Legal 
Problems and Practical Suggestions, in LEVERAGED BuYOUTS, supra note 2, at 120-24. 
4 Balser, Leveraged Buyout Financing, in HANDBOOK OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND 
BuYOUTS 503, 503 (S.J. Lee & R.D. Colman ed. 1981). For example, investors in RJR Nabisco 
Inc. were expected to enjoy annual returns of 50% or more. See How LBOs are Shaping Up, 
EcoNOMIST, Nov. 26, 1988, at 75. 
5 Lenders fall into two categories depending on the party financing the transaction. The 
first category involves LBOs in which the selling shareholders provide leverage by taking the 
buyer's note for a significant portion of the purchase price. See, e.g., Cate v. Nicely (In re 
Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567, 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
656 F.2d 230, 231 (6th Cir. 1981); Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526,528 (E.D. Okla. 1966), 
a!J'd, 389 F.2d 233, 234 (lOth Cir. 1968); Sharrer v. Sandlas, 103 A.D.2d 873, 873, 477 
N.Y.S.2d 897, 898 (1984). 
In the second category of LBOs, the lender financing the transaction is an independent 
institution. See, e.g., Wieboldt Store, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 494-95 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1988); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 
430, 432 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank and Trust Co., 77 
Bankr. 754, 755-56 (Bankr. C.D. Call987), af!'d sub nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 851 
(9th Cir. 1988); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 178 (C.D. Cal. 
1985); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 566 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub 
nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Armstrong Co. v. Limperis (In re Process-Manz Press), 236 F. 
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against those of Target's unsecured creditors in the event of Target's 
business failure. By taking security interests in Target's assets, the 
lender reduces the assets to which Target's creditors look for re-
payment. Several legal theories are available to creditors to chal-
lenge the validity of lender's security interests or to seek other relief 
from LBO participants.6 
The law of fraudulent transfers is the most creditor protective.7 
This body of law originated several centuries ago at a time when 
Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967). 
6 These theories and their potential usefulness for ch3,llenging an LBO are discussed in 
Queenan, The Collapsed Leveraged Buyout and the Trustee in Bankruptcy, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 
28-4 7 (1989) and Shenvin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. 
L. REv. 449, 453-64 (1988). These theories include lack of corporate power (ultra vires), 
equitable subordination, breach of fiduciary duty by corporate directors and shareholders, 
and unlawful distribution to shareholders, or unlawful redemption of shares, under state 
corporate statutes. See Shenvin, supra, at 453-62. 
Although each of these legal theories is potentially applicable, its application to an LBO 
is not without problems. For example, directors normally owe no fiduciary duty to creditors 
because directors are selected by shareholders and represent the corporation. See Queenan, 
supra note 6, at 32. But see Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 584 (holding controlling shareholder 
liable for breach of duty to creditors); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. 
Weiss, 305 N.Y. 1, 9-11, 110 N.E.2d 397, 399-400 (1953) (complaint stated cause of action 
for breach of fiduciary duty to creditors). The ultra vires doctrine is overinclusive because it 
may hinder transactions in which creditors' rights are not in danger of being harmed. 
Sherwin, supra, at 463. Moreover, in light of the expansion of business purposes and corporate 
powers, the doctrine has lost much of its potency. See, e.g., Emerald Hills Country Club, Inc. 
v. Hollywood, Inc. (In re Emerald Hills Country Clubs, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 408, 419 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1983) (casting doubt on continued validity of doctrine). 
On the other hand, the remedy of equitable subordination may be helpful in LBO cases. 
This common law remedy is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 510(b)(1988) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Although the doctrine was traditionally applied to subordinate the claims of insiders, it may 
also be applied to subordinate an independent lender's claim if its conduct is sufficiently 
egregious. Anaconda-Erickson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 29 Bankr. 139, 
169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 185, 187 (2d Cir. 1985); see also In re Process-
Manz Press, 236 F. Supp at 348. The lender's interest, however, will be subordinated only to 
the extent necessary to offset the harm suffered. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel 
Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 1977). 
Professor Clark has noted that the doctrine of equitable subordination may, in many 
cases, be the "functional" equivalent of fraudulent transfer law. Clark, The Duties of the 
Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505, 518-36 (1977). 
' See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 453-64; Queenan, supra note 6, at 28-47. The law of 
fraudulent transfers is contained in three separate statutes: the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act ("UFCA"), 7A U.L.A. 430, Supp. 107 (1985 & Supp. 1990), currendy in force 
in 12 states; the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA"), 7A U.L.A. 643, Supp. 130 
(1985 & Supp. 1990), in force in 24 states; and the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988). 
Under each of these statutes, the law of fraudulent transfers applies equally to transfers of 
property and incurrences of obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a); UFCA § 3, 7A U.L.A. 448; 
UFTA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 652. Thus, for example, where the form of the LBO transaction has 
Target giving a secured guaranty to the lender, the guaranty may be a fraudulent transfer. 
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the practice ofleveraged buyouts was non-existent. 8 The application 
of such ancient law to determine the validity of a modern commer-
cial transaction may thus seem incongruous.9 From a policy stand-
See Carlson, supra note 3, at 81. By giving the guaranty, Target clearly "incurs"· an obligation, 
and by granting a security interest, it unquestionably makes a "conveyance" or "transfer." 
See Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 
125 U. PA. L. REv. 235, 241 (1976). "Transfer" and "conveyance" have virtually the same 
meaning. The substitution of "transfer" for "conveyance" in the UITA was designed to 
emphasize that the new Act applies to transfers of real property as well as personal property. 
UITA, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 640. 
Although the three statutes are very similar in fundamental respects, there are some 
important differences. The principal difference between section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code 
and both the UFCA and the UITA concerns the applicable statute of limitations. Section 
548 applies to transfers made within one year prior to bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). The 
UITA has a four-year statute of limitations. UITA § 9(a), 7A U.L.A. 665. The UFCA 
incorporates the statute of limitations of the particular state. See UITA § 9 comment 2, 7 A 
U.L.A. 666. Some states have a six-year statute of limitations. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 260, 
§ 2 (1988). The trustee in bankruptcy may take advantage of the longer statute of limitations. 
See 11 U.S.C. 544(b) (1988). For other substantive differences among the statutes, see gen-
erally Acles & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 U. ILL. 
L. REv. 527 (1985); Cook & Men dales, Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 
62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87 (1988). 
8 The present law of fraudulent transfers has its roots in the statute passed by the 
Parliament in 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). In those days, the statute was intended to curb the 
practice by which debtors sold their property to friends or relatives for a nominal sum to 
defeat the efforts of creditors to satisfy their claims. Once a creditor had given up or 
compromised its claim in frustration, the debtor would reclaim the property. See Baird & 
Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law andlts Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REv. 829,829 (1985); 
1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 61, at 83-84 (rev. ed. 1940), 
9 Thus, for example, Professors Baird and Jackson have argued that fraudulent transfer 
law should not affect an LBO because "(a] fi~ that incurs obligations in the course of a 
buyout does not seem at all like the Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to his brother 
for a pittance." Baird & Jackson, supra note 8, at 852. Although Baird and Jackson concede 
that fraudulent transfer law should make gifts by an insolvent debtor actionable, without 
regard to fraudulent intent, they contend that an LBO should be exempt because of its 
business context. !d. at 831-34. They argue that creditors may not object to the LBO, and 
those that do may prohibit it contractually. See id. at 834-35. For the most part, these 
arguments have failed to persuade courts. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 
803 F.2d 1288, 1297 (3d Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Vadnais Lumber 
Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100 Bankr. 127, 134-35 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 1989); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1988); 
Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 430, 433 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Anderson Indus. v. Anderson (In re Anderson Indus.), 55 Bankr. 
922, 926 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985). Some courts, however, have been influenced by Baird's 
and Jackson's article. See Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to use 
the law of fraudulent transfers to invalidate transfers made to selling shareholders in an 
LBO); Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr. 754, 759-60 (Bankr. 
· C.D. Cal. 1987); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 179 (C.D. Cal. 
1985). 
Several articles have criticized Baird's and Jackson's views of the scope of fraudulent 
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point, however, a modern LBO is no different from an eighteenth 
century transaction that unfairly deprived a debtor's creditors of 
the ability to be repaid. 10 As a result, courts have generally evaluated 
such transactions under fraudulent transfer law, although some 
courts have limited its scope in various ways.n 
Fraudulent transfer law protects creditors from their debtors' 
abusive conduct. It defines two categories of abusive conduct. The 
first category encompasses tr:ansfers "with actual intent to hinder, 
delay, or defraud" creditors.12 Fraudulent intent is often difficult to 
prove, however, because it involves inquiry into subjective inten-
tion.13 Therefore, a second category relies on objective criteria to 
establish fraudulent intent.14 Accordingly, even if a transferor does 
not have actual, fraudulent intent, a transfer will be conclusively 
presumed fraudulent if its effect is to cause injury to creditors. 
Creditors generally rely on the second category of fraudulent trans-
fer law, "constructive" fraud, to challenge an LB0.15 
transfer law. See generally Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781 (1988); see also Queenan, supra note 6, at 24-
25; Note, Fraudulent ConVCJ'ance Law and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1503-
04 (1987). 
10 The argument is considered in great d!!tail in Smyser, supra note 9, at 793-802. 
11 See infra text accompanying notes 203-25. 
12 The UFCA's intentional fraud section provides: "Every conveyance made and every 
obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in Jaw, to 
hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present 
and future creditors." UFCA § 7, 7A U.L.A. 509 (1985). The UITA contains a similar 
provision. UFTA § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. 652 (1985). The UITA adds, however, a list of eleven 
factors to be considered in determining fraudulent intent. Id. § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. 653. The 
Bankruptcy Code's provision is substantially identical except with respect to the applicable 
statute of limitations. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988). 
13 Thus, traditionally courts have resolved claims based on intentional fraud by relying. 
on "badges of fraud" rather than on proof of subjective intention. Alces & Dorr, supra note 
7, at 535. See Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1304 ("[U]nder Pennsylvania law, an intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors may be inferred from transfers in which consideration 
is Jacking and where the transferor and transferee have knowledge of the claims of creditors 
and know that the creditors cannot be paid."); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 
F.2d 978, 984 (1st Cir. 1983) (circumstantial evidence relevant to issue of actual intent). 
14 Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 778 (1984). Thus, under 
all the fraudulent transfer Jaws, a transfer is deemed fraudulent, regardless of intention, if 
it is made without "fair consideration" or "reasonably equivalent value" and at the time of 
the transfer, the debtor either is insolvent or rendered insolvent, is in business and is left 
with "unreasonably small capital," or anticipates incurring debts beyond its ability to pay. See 
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988); UFCA, §§ 5, 6, 7A U.L.A. 504, 507 (1985); UITA §§ 2, 4, 5, 7A 
U.L.A. 648,652-53, 657 (1985). The distinction between constructive fraud and actual intent 
is sometimes difficult to maintain. SeeP. ALCES, THE LAw OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 
11 5.0.3 [3] at p. 5-111 (1989). 
1s Cieri, Leveraged Buyouts, supra note 1, at 353; Note, supra note 9, at 1496. 
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A debtor is likely to cause injury to creditors in one of two 
ways. One is by making a gift. 16 The other17 is by making a transfer 
for which it does not receive "fair consideration"18 or "reasonably 
equivalent value."19 Both types of transfer can potentially harm 
creditors because they diminish the debtor's estate to which credi-
tors look for satisfaction of their claims. Therefore, under fraudu-
lent transfer law, any transfer that is not supported by "fair consid-
eration" or ·~reasonably equivalent value" is presumed constructively 
fraudulent. 
In an LBO, it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish that 
Target received "fair consideration" or "reasonably equivalent 
value" in exchange for its transfer. 20 The lender gives value in 
16 Professor Clark justified the fraudulent transfer laws' condemnation of gifts by debtors 
in precarious financial circumstances by the "normative ideal of [r]espect" which he argued 
underlies these laws and "can be captured by a cliche: be just before you are generous." 
Clark, supra note 6, at 510, 511. The cliche also appears in 1 G. GLENN, supra note 8, § 264, 
at 451. According to Clark, fraudulent transfer law has other normative ideals: "truth," 
"evenhandedness" and "nonhinderance." Thus, a deb~or's transfer of a "false" mortgage to 
a friend in order to avoid paying creditors offends the ideal of "truth." Clark, supra note 6, 
at 509. A debtor who satisfies the claims of one creditor in preference to others offends the 
ideal of "evenhandedness." Id. at 511-12. Finally, a debtor who converts liquid assets into 
illiquid ones in order to hinder creditors offends the ideal of "nonhinderance." Id. at 512-
13. 
17 The reference here is to transfers for inadequate consideration, as opposed to gifts 
for which no consideration can exist by definition. The fraudulent transfer laws as currently 
in force do not draw this distinction. McCoid, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers 
for Inadequate Consideration, 62 TEX. L. REv. 639, 647-48 (1983). 
18 The UFCA defines fair consideration as being given for property or an obligation 
when (a) in "good faith," as a fair equivalent, and in exchange therefore, property is conveyed 
or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (b) the property or obligation "is received in good faith 
to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not disproportionately small as 
compared with the value of the property, or obligation obtained." UFCA § 3, 7A U.L.A. 
448-49 (1985). The definition of fair consideration is very different from the consideration 
necessary to support a simple contract. Queenan, supra note 6, at 8. First, under the law of 
fraudulent transfers, courts inquire into the adequacy of the consideration given for property 
or an obligation. See id. But cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) (ordinarily 
courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration). Second, under fraudulent transfer 
law, antecedent debt qualifies as consideration. Contract law provides otherwise. Queenan, 
supra note 6, at 8. Finally, fraudulent transfer law, but not contract law, requires that the 
debtor, not a third party, receive the consideration. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 8, § 276, at 473; 
Queenan, supra note 6, at 8. 
19 The Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA require that the debtor receive "reasonably 
equivalent value" for property transferred or an obligation incurred but omit the subjective 
element of "good faith" that the UFCA contains. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1988); UFTA 
§§ 4(a)(2), 5, 7 A U.L.A. 653, 657 (1985). Neither the Code nor the UFTA defines "reasonably 
equivalent value." Both, however, define "value" as "property, or satisfaction, or securing of 
a present or antecedent debt," with some limitations that are not germane here. See II U.S.C. 
§ 548 (d)(2)(A) (I988); UFTA § 3, 7A U.L.A. 650 (I985). 
20 See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 182 (C.D. Cal, I986) 
March 1991] LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 383 
return for the transfer. That value, however, goes to pay off the 
selling shareholders rather than to Target. Consequently, Target 
does not receive any direct benefit from the LB0.21 
Target's failure to receive "fair consideration" does not establish 
that the LBO is ipso facto constructively fraudulent. Were the rule 
not so limited, it would chill a debtor's freedom to dispose of its 
property and enter into advantageous relationships. Consequently, 
fraudulent transfer law only restricts a debtor's freedom when that 
freedom is at the expense of its creditors. Fraudulent transfer law 
only invalidates those transfers lacking "fair consideration" or "rea-
sonably equivalent value" if a debtor's financial condition is precar-
ious at the time of the transfer, or is made precarious as a result of 
the transfer. 22 
This article is concerned with the manner in which financial 
precariousness is determined in the LBO context. Although finan-
cial precariousness is evaluated under three alternative tests, only 
two of these tests are of practical significance in an LBO; namely, 
the "insolvency" test and the "unreasonably small capital" test. 23 
("[t]his is probably the case in every leveraged buyout"); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 
565 F. Supp. 556, 574 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff?d sub nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 
803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). But see Kupetz v. 
Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr. 754, 761 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987). In 
Kupetz, the court held that, even though Target may not have received fair consideration, 
from the selling shareholders' perspective, the sale of Target was for fair consideration. !d. 
In order to distinguish the case from Credit Managers, which involved a "'classic' leveraged 
buyout scenario in which there possibly can never be fair consideration," the court seized on 
the fact that the selling shareholders were unaware that they were being paid from the 
proceeds of loans. !d. 
21 Target may receive a number of substantial indirect benefits from an LBO. They may 
include new or more motivated management, tax benefits resulting from the substitution of 
deductible interest payments for nondeductible dividends, and, if Target was previously a 
public corporation, savings from avoiding the expense of complying with securities laws. See 
Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 43 
Bus. LAw. 27, 35 (i987); Queenan, supra note 6, at 10-13. These benefits, however, do not 
constitute consideration. See, e.g., Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 576 (new management not fair 
consideration within the meaning of Pennsylvania's UFCA); see also Rosenberg, supra note 7, 
at 243 ("a literal reading [of fair consideration] requires receipt of a balance sheet asset or 
cancellation of a balance sheet liability to qualify as fair consideration"). 
22 The critical date for determining financial precariousness is the date on which the 
challenged transfer occurred or immediately thereafter. See Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 
F.2d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 1974); Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber 
Supply, Inc.), 100 Bankr. 127, 137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 577; 
Cate v. Nicely (In re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Angier 
v. Worrel, 346 Pa. 450, 453, 31 A.2d 87, 89 (1943). But see Barrett v. Continental Ill. Nat'l 
Bank & Trust Co., 882 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1989) (period extending in both directions from 
critical date). 
23 Under the third test, a transfer lacking consideration is fraudulent if the debtor 
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Part I discusses the "insolvency" test24 and Part II discusses the 
"unreasonably small capital" test.25 These discussions suggest that 
an LBO's compliance with fraudulent transfer law is dependent on 
the valuation standard a court chooses in construing these tests. 
The cases reveal that two basic valuation standards exist. The first 
assumes Target to be in liquidation, whether such liquidation is 
immediate or orderly. The other standard determines Target's 
value on a going-concern basis. The standards that guide a court's 
assessment of Target's financial condition are inherently vague and 
can produce inconsistent and unpredictable results. 
Part III explores why a court might choose one approach over 
another.26 It suggests that judicial assessment of Target's financial 
condition is subject to the court's view regarding the acceptable 
reach of fraudulent transfer law as well as its conclusion whether 
unsecured creditors or LBO participants, particularly lenders, 
should more fairly assume the loss from a failed LBO. Courts more 
sympathetic to the claims of creditors, particularly creditors who 
held claims at the time of an LBO, are more likely to employ a 
liquidation approach. Conversely, courts that entertain serious res-
"intends" or "believes" that it will incur debts beyond its ability to pay. UFCA § 6, 7A U.L.A. 
507 (1985). The Bankruptcy Code and the UFTA have similar provisions but add that a 
transfer would also be fraudulent if the debtor "reasonably should have believed" that it 
would incur such debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(B)(iii) (1988); UFTA § 4 (a)(2)(ii), 7A 
U.L.A. 652-53. Even under the UFCA, however, courts sometimes evaluate the debtor's state 
of mind under a reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Waukesha County Dep't of Social Serv. 
v. Loper, 53 Wis. 2d 713,717, 193 N.W.2d 679,681 (1972) (whether individual debtor "knew 
or should have known" of inability to pay debts). 
It seems inappropriate to avoid an LBO lender's interests under this test. The relevant 
"intent" or "belief" under the statute is that of Target, or its principals. I.f the lender is 
unaware of Target's intent or belief, it would be manifestly unfair to penalize the lender for 
someone else's inequitable conduct. See Sherwin, supra note 6, at 501-02. Moreover, such a 
result would be inconsistent with cases decided under the intentional fraud branch of fraud-
ulent transfer law. For example, in Gleneagles, the court stated that the LBO lender's security 
interests would not be set aside for intentional fraud if the lender was unaware of the fraud. 
See Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 580; see also Interstate Acceptance Corp. v. Lovins, 380 S.W.2d 
805 (Ky. 1964) (transferee's good faith precludes transferor's creditors from attaching the 
transfer). If the lender is aware of Target's fraudulent intent, however, liability under the 
present test would be redul)dant. Similarly, in the LBO context, the function of the test is 
easily accomplished by the "unreasonably small capital" test. Under the developing case law, 
adequacy of capital requires an analysis of Target's ability to generate cash flow to operate 
as a going concern. See infra text accompanying notes 175-78 for a discussion of this 
developing case law. Thus, if Target expects to generate adequate cash flow to cover its 
expected debts, it is unlikely that it would anticipate incurring debts beyond its ability to pay. 
24 See infra notes 28-136 a_nd accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 137-78 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 179-232 and accompanying text. 
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ervations about applying constructive fraud to LBOs are more likely 
to approach issues of valuation from a going-concern perspective. 
Part IV offers rationales why Target's valuation as a going-
concern as determined by its cash flow accommodates the need to 
protect creditors while also protecting the reasonable commercial 
expectations of participants in an LB0.27 Part IV also suggests that 
cash flow should sufficiently measure an LBO's compliance with 
fraudulent transfer law. If the court finds Target's future cash flow 
to be positive, Target should be deemed solvent as well as reasonably 
capitalized. The article concludes by suggesting that, in evaluating 
Target's financial condition based on cash flow, courts should con-
sider the claims of subsequent creditors. 
I. THE INSOLVENCY TEST AND STANDARDS OF VALUATION USED IN 
DETERMINING INSOLVENCY 
A. Statutory Definitions of Insolvency 
One test of the validity of an LBO is whether Target was either 
"insolvent" at the time of the LBO or made insolvent as a result of 
it. 28 With some differences in language and occasionally in result, 
all three statutory definitions of fraudulent transfer law measure 
"insolvency" by a balance-sheet test that compares assets against 
liabilities.29 The Bankruptcy Code provides the most straightfor-
ward formulation of the balance-sheet test: Target is insolvent when 
its debts are "greater than [its] property at a fair valuation."S0 The 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") tracks the Bankruptcy 
Code.31 It provides for a rebuttable presumption of insolvency, 
however, when Target is "generally not paying [its] debts as they 
become due."32 
?:1 See infra notes 233-77 and accompanying text. 
28 See supra note 22 for the relevant authorities. 
29 See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 701 F.2d 978, 983 (1st Cir. 1983) 
(balance sheet); Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 577 (lst Cir. 
1980); Pinto v. Philadelphia Fresh Food Terminal Corp. (In re Pinto), 98 Bankr. 200, 209 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989); Northern Va. Bank v. Vecco Constr. Indus. (In re Vecco Constr. 
Indus.), 9 Bankr. 866,871 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Trout, 145 Ariz. 
355, 360, 701 P.2d 851, 856 (Ariz. 1985); Furniture Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 
398, 400 (Utah 1984). 
so 11 U.S.C. § 101 (29)(A) (1988). 
st UFTA § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985). 
52 Id. § 2(b). The drafters added the presumption in order to help a creditor overcome 
the difficulties typically involved in proving insolvency in the balance sheet sense.Id. § 2(b) 
comment 1, 7A U.L.A. 648-49. The presumption sets forth a test of insolvency in the equity 
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"Insolvency" under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
("UFCA") is equivocal: Target is insolvent when the "present fair 
salable value" of its assets is less than the amount required to pay 
its "probable liability on [its] existing debts as they become absolute 
and matured."33 It is unclear whether the UFCA states a balance-
sheet test or whether it also incorporates an equity or cash-flow 
test.34 
B. Alternative Standards of Valuation 
Although the basic concept of balance-sheet insolvency is clear, 
its application is anything but certain. This uncertainty largely arises 
because of the various standards that are available to value Target's 
assets and liabilities. Thus, a court can value Target's assets, assum-
ing they were to be liquidated immediately. On the other hand, a 
court could value those same assets in terms of their value to Target 
as a going concern. 
1. Valuation on the Basis of Liquidation 
The most extreme liquidation standard to value appears in a 
line of cases decided under the UFCA. This case law often empha-
sizes the words "present" and "salable" in the UFCA's "present fair 
sense. This test is easier to meet because it may be met by a company temporarily experiencing 
cash flow problems although the value of its assets may exceed its liabilities. See Kreps v. 
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 351 F.2d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1965); South Cent. Enters., Inc. v. 
Farrington (In re Progressive Farmers Ass'n), 50 Bankr. 525, 543-44 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985). 
The equity test of solvency, or common law test as it is also known, appears in the Uniform 
Commercial Code along with the balance sheet test. See U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1989). 
ss UFCA § 2, 7A U.L.A. 442 (1985). 
34 See United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1304 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) (cash flow); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 
556, 579 (M.D. Pa. 1983) ("a company with highly illiquid assets would not be insolvent if 
the operation of its business produced sufficient cash for the payment of its debts as they 
matured"), aff'd sui; nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1307; Fleet v. 
Rhode (In re Fleet), 89 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (referring to the UFCA as 
stating the "common-law insolvency test" but also adding, somewhat equivocally, that UFCA 
"embraces not only insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, but also 'a condition wherein a debtor 
has insufficient present salable assets to pay existing debts as they mature"') (quoting United 
States v. Tabor Coun Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1303 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Larrimer 
v. Feeney, 411 Pa. 604, 608, 192 A.2d 351, 353 (1963)). But see Meyer v. General Am. Corp., 
569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 1977) (UFCA's test "is not insolvency in the bankruptcy sense 
but merely a showing that the party's assets are not sufficient to meet liabilities as they become 
due"); Pinto v. Philadelphia Fresh Food Terminal Corp. (In re Pinto), 98 Bankr. 200, 209 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (noting that UFCA states a common-law test); Vener, Transfers in 
Fraud of Greditcrs under the Uniform Acts and the Bankruptcy Code, 92 CoM. L.J. 218, 224 (1987) 
(noting the ambivalence of the UFCA test). 
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salable value" test.35 This judicial emphasis suggests valuation based 
on an assumption that assets will be immediately liquidated.36 Mea-
suring value in terms of immediate liquidation renders illiquid assets 
valueless. Consequently, under this line of cases, assets that are not 
"liquid" or cannot be fairly quickly sold do not become part of the 
"assets" column in Target's balance sheet. 
In United States v. Gleneagles Investment Co.,37 the court seemed 
to apply this standard to determine Target's solvency. The Gleneagles 
court held the LBO voidable under both the constructive and in-
tentional fraud provisions of the Pennsylvania UFCA. 38 In Glenea-
gles, Target was the parent company of a group of subsidiaries 
engaged in coal production and the sale of coallands.39 The United 
States sued over certain delinquent taxes and sought, under the 
UFCA, to invalidate certain mortgages and liens given to the lender 
to secure the loans made to finance the acquisition.40 
Gleneagles illustrates the profound impact that choice of a val-
uation standard can have on a court's determination of whether an 
LBO complies with fraudulent transfer law. The Gleneagles court 
greatly aided the government's claim of constructive fraud by 
broadly construing the phrase "present fair salable value" in making 
its insolvency determination. As noted, an insolvency determination 
requires a court to. engage in "facts-and-figures" analysis to deter-
mine if Target's assets exceed its liabilities.41 Obviously, the specific 
55 See, e.g., Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp at 578 ("present may not be disregarded") (quoting 
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 313 Pa. 467, 475, 169 A. 209, 213 (1933), cert. denied, 
291 U.S. 680 (1934)); In re Fleet, 89 Bankr. at 425 (emphasizing liquidity and salability); 
Fidelity Trust Co., 313 Pa. at 475, 169 A. at 209 (explicitly emphasizing the immediacy of the 
sale by noting that it was error to find "fair salable value" instead of "present" fair salable 
value); Corbin v. Franklin Nat'l Bank (In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig.), 2 Bankr. 687, 
711 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating '"present fair salable 
value' means just that; the fair value of presently salable assets."). 
56 See supra note 35 for the cited authorities. One commentator has noted that "[t]he 
word 'present' in the UFCA definition would seem to suggest that the debtor's assets should 
be evaluated at liquidation value rather than fair market value." Heiman, Fraudulent Convey-
ances, in 2 AssET-BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE§ 21.03(2)[a), at 21-15 (1987). 
Rosenberg also notes that although the balance sheet test anticipates the possibility of liqui-
dation within a reasonable time, the UFCA test anticipates a more immediate liquidation. 
Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 254 n.50; see also McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REv. 404, 420 (1933) (noting the intermediacy of the UFCA test 
between the bankruptcy and the equity standard). 
s7 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Gleneagles is the first and, so far only, case to void 
an LBO financed by a third party as a fraudulent transfer. 
ss I d. at 564. 
S9 Id. 
~o I d. at 560, 572. 
~ 1 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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assets and liabilities considered by the court will critically influence 
the court's ultimate insolvency or solvency conclusion.42 The court's 
choice of valuation standard may thus determine the conclusion by 
excluding certain assets from consideration. 
The Gleneagles court appeared to avoid a forced-sale standard 
by interpreting "present fair salable value" to mean "that value 
which can be obtained if the assets are liquidated with reasonable 
promptness in an arms-length transaction in an existing and not [a] 
theoretical market."43 The court's reference to an "arms-length 
transaction" suggests an exchange between a "willing seller and 
buyer."44 It negates the compulsion and consequent sacrifice in price 
usually associated with a forced-sale standard.45 Moreover, despite 
the court's assumption of liquidating assets with "promptness," it 
42 See, e.g., Kepler v. Atkinson (In re Atkinson), 63 Bankr. 266, 269 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 
1986) (debtor's claim against her son not an asset because it could not be sold); Kepler v. 
Schmalbach (In re Lamanski), 56 Bankr. 981, 989 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1986) (worthless coun· 
terclaim not an asset); Chase Nat'! Bank v. United States Trust Co., 236 A. D. 500, 503, 260 
N.Y.S. 40,44 (1932) (unsecured indebtedness due to debtor from a realty company and 35% 
of its stock were not assets because unsalable). 
The foregoing cases underscore an important fact: to qualify as an asset, property must 
be leviable, i.e., available to satisfy the claims of creditors. See UFCA § 1, 7A U.L.A. 430 
(1985) (defining "asset" to mean property available for the payment of debts); see also 1 G. 
GLENN, supra note 8, § 139, at 258 (noting that "transferability" and ability to be converted 
into cash are the essence of an asset). 
43 565 F. Supp. at 578. 
44 American Nat'! Bank & Trust v. Bone, 333 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1964); Syracuse 
Eng'g Co. v. Haight, llO F.2d 468, 471-72 (2d Cir. 1940); Northern Va. Bank v. Vecco 
Constr. Indus., 9 Bankr. 866, 871 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); First Nat'! Bank v. Perdue Hous. 
Indus., Inc. (In re Perdue Hous. Indus., Inc.), 437 F. Supp. 36, 38 (W.D. Okla. 1977); In re 
Bichel Optical Laboratories, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 545, 547 (D. Minn. 1969). 
The judicial concept of fair market value as determined by a "willing seller and a willing 
buyer" has a long pedigree. See Bonright & Pickett, Valuation to Detennine Solvency under the 
Bankruptcy Act, 29 CoLUM. L. REv. 582, 600 (1929) (citing Duncan v. Landis, 106 F. 839 (3d 
Cir. 1901), as the leading authority that rejected immediate liquidation value and established 
the willing-seller, willing-buyer test as the appropriate valuation standard in bankruptcy 
litigation). The concept, however, is often misused or little understood. For example, the 
credibility gap on the part of the appraisal profession has spawned intense debate concerning 
the meaning of "fair market value." See Montalva, Appraising For Lenders-Part One, THE 
SECURED LENDER, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 55 (cataloguing nine different concepts of value); see 
also Queenan, Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92 CoM. L.J. 18, 19 
(1987) (catalog\Jing six different valuation standards for valuing security interests). 
45 The value obtained under such a standard presupposes a prompt sale where it is 
assumed the buyer's price reflects the seller's "necessities and embarrassments." See, e.g., 
Duncan v. Landis, 106 F. 839, 858 (3d Cir. 1901). The value obtained under a forced-sale 
standard may also reflect the lack of advertising and sales efforts that normally accompany 
other types of sales. Queenan, supra note 44, at 19. The American Society of Appraisers' 
Machinery and Equipment Committee, however, defines "liquidation value" as the value 
obtained at a "properly advertised and conducted public auction," though under a forced 
sale condition. Montalva, supra note 44, at 56. 
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qualifies the term "promptness" with "reasonable,"46 again seeming 
to avoid the undue sacrifice in price that immediate liquidation 
would cause. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Glenea-
gles used a fairly broad, i.e., harsh, standard of liquidation. Indeed, 
the court relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion, 
Larrimer v. Feeney47 in which the court stated: 
A debtor may have . . . assets which have a small salable 
value, but which if held to a subsequent date could have 
a much higher salable value. Nevertheless, if the present 
salable value of assets [is] less than the amount required 
to pay existing debts as they mature, the debtor is insol-
vent.48 (Emphasis in original.) 
Some commentators have noted that a valuation standard based on 
"present fair salable value" is inherently uncertain because it re-
quires a further determination of the amount of time and the 
conditions under which it might be "fair" to allow Target to dispose 
of its assets.49 
Nevertheless, Gleneagles and Larrimer suggest that, at a mini-
mum, there are two periods of time within which the sale of Target's 
assets is assumed to occur, one shorter than the other. These courts 
concluded that the UFCA contemplated "present" liquidation 
whereas the Bankruptcy ~ode envisioned "subsequent" liquida-
tion.50 This distinction is based on the view that the bankruptcy test 
46 565 F. Supp. 556, 578 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Realty 
Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
47 Id. (citing Larrimer v. Fenney, 411 Pa. 604, 192 A.2d 351 (1963)). 
48 Fenney, 411 Pa. at 608, 192 A.2d at 353. 
49 See Bonright & Pickett, supra note 44, at 594; see also id. at 598 (noting a similar 
indeterminacy in respect to the fair valuation standard applicable in bankruptcy). In bank-
ruptcy, however, it is "admitted that a 'distressed' sale is not the proper test." Darky v. 
Shawnee Southwest, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 587, 591 (W.D. Okla. 1975); see Syracuse Eng'g Co., 
110 F.2d at 471; Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 
430, 438 n.IO (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. 
(In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 56 Bankr. 339, 385 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). 
50 See infra text accompanying notes 56-59 for an illustration of the difference between 
the UFCA test and bankruptcy test. See also Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp. at 579; LaTTimer, 411 Pa. 
at 608, 192 A.2d at 353. These courts distinguished between an asset's "small present salable 
value" and its "higher value if held to a subsequent date." The distinction implies that the 
"small" amount obtained when an asset is sold quickly results from the seller's lack of power 
to decline the price offered as well as the brevity of the time allowed for negotiating and 
completing the sale. See Bonright & Pickett, supra note 44, at 600. In contrast, the "higher" 
value obtained when an asset is sold at a "subsequent date" implies a sale between a "willing" 
seller and a "willing" buyer, under normal market conditions. See id.; see also American Nat'l 
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of solvency evolved from a desire to protect debtors from invol-
untary bankruptcy if they had more assets than liabilities. 51 
On the other hand, some commentators have viewed the UFCA 
standard as embodying an amalgam of two approaches. 52 This stan-
dard encompasses insolvency in the sense of both bankruptcy and 
equity.53 Under this view, if a debtor's net worth on paper is nega-
tive, the "present fair salable value" of its assets must be less than 
its liabilities. 54 The converse, however, is not true. A debtor's net 
worth on paper may be substantial: that is, more than sufficient to 
pass muster under the bankruptcy test of insolvency. If the debtor's 
net worth cannot be liquidated for an amount sufficient to pay its 
obligations as they become due, the debtor would be insolvent under 
the UFCA.55 
The 1922 Montana case of In re Crystal Ice & Fuel Co.56 is an 
early illustration of the difference between the UFCA test and the 
bankruptcy test. A corporation had issued a trust deed to secure a 
bond issue. The corporation later defaulted on interest payments 
and the trust deed became subject to foreclosure. 57 The evidence 
indicated that the debtor's assets exceeded its debts under the bank-
ruptcy test of "fair valuation," even though under the "present fair 
salable value standard," they did not.58 The court expressly distin-
guished between the two tests, observing that "although [a debtor's] 
Bank & Trust Co., 333 F.2d at 987 (price obtained at a "prompt" sale does not represent fair 
market value); Syracuse Eng'g Co., llO F.2d at 471. 
51 Fleet v. Rhode (In re Fleet), 89 Bankr. 420, 425 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) ("the bankruptcy 
solvency test has traditionally been stringent, due to the vestige from the day of commonplace 
involuntary proceedings that 'a man ought not to be forced into bankruptcy if, at a fair 
valuation of his possessions, he has more than he owes"') (quoting McGill v. Commercial 
Credit Co., 243 F. 637, 646-49 (D. Md. 1917)). Professor Glenn notes the same difference 
between the tests and raises an interesting question. See 1 G: GLENN, supra note 8, § 272, at 
465-66. He states that a transfer could pass muster under the lenient bankruptcy test but 
fail the "present fair salable value" test. Id. In such a case, according to Professor Glenn, the 
trustee in bankruptcy would be well advised to bring his or her suit under state law. ld. at 
466. Such a suit was permitted under the Bankruptcy Act of 1938. 11 U.S.C. § llO(e) (1970). 
The trustee's right to proceed in this manner has been preserved. See id. § 544(b) (1988). 
This seems to be what the trustee in Gleneagles did. See 565 F. Supp. at 583. 
52 See L.P. KING & M.L. CooK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANK• 
RUPTCY 348 (1985) ("The UFCA sets forth a hybrid test for involvency ••.. The Bankruptcy 
Code, by contrast, provides a simple 'balance' sheet test for insolvency."); Verner, supra note 
34, at 224. 
5s See supra note 35 for the cited authorities. 
54 LaTTimer, 4ll Pa. at 608, 192 A.2d at 353. 
55 ld. 
56 283 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Mont. 1922). 
57 Id. at 1008. 
58 ld. at 1009-10. 
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property be not presently salable for enough to pay his debts, its 
fair valuation may be more than enough; and if so, he is not insol-
vent nor subject to bankruptcy for insolvency."59 The distinction 
between these standards is significant not only in terms of different 
estimates of value but also, and more importantly, in terms of the 
assets that may be included to determine solvency. 
Gleneagles dramatically illustrates the effect that the distinction 
between these two standards has on solvency determinations in the 
LBO context. The defendants, seeking to establish Target's solvency 
at the time of the LBO, showed that Target owned "vast lands, culm 
banks, and coal reserves."60 The court acknowledged that these 
assets had "tremendous value."61 Nevertheless, the court declined 
to include these assets in its solvency determination because they 
were "highly illiquid," requiring "an extended period of time" to 
liquidate. 62 In addition, the defendants established that Target had 
mining equipment with a "fair market value" of between six and 
twenty-two million dollars.63 The court also disregarded this evi-
dence because the equipment was not "rapidly -salable."64 It noted 
59 Id. at 1010. The court noted that "[a]t times a debtor's property, though aniply 
sufficient in value to discharge all his obligations, may not be convertible without sacrifice 
into that form by which payments may be made." Id. Based on this reasoning, several 
commentators have noted that "saleable value and fair value are not synonymous." 2 CoLUER 
ON BANKRUPTCY 11 101.26 at p. 101-55 (15th ed. 1985); see also Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 
255. Rosenberg noted the distinction and stated that: 
if an asset can be converted to cash only in the future, it will not be included 
on the asset side .... For example, in the prevalent mid-1970's real estate 
market, it is highly questionable whether a large and expensive piece of com-
mercial real estate could be included in the computation at a value approaching 
its "real" value inasmuch as it is most unlikely that a willing buyer could be 
found within a time period approaching immediacy. 
I d. See also McLaughlin, supra note 36, at 420 ("present fair salable value" anticipates imme-
diate liquidation whereas "fair valuation" anticipates the possibility of liquidation within a 
reasonable time). But see Ragusin, Brother-Sister Corporate Guaranties: Increased Legal Acknowl-
edgment of Business World Realities, 11 J. CoRP. L. 391, 403 (1986) (referring to the distinction 
as an "extravagant theory concocted in some circles" and wondering if the distinction is "still 
valid"). 
60 United States v. Gleneagles lnv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 579 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub 
nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied 
483 u.s. 1005 (1987). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 I d. The court considered several factors in determining whether Target's assets were 
"rapidly salable." First, it considered whether a "fairly liquid" market existed for a particular 
asset. Id. For example, the court found that Target's Huber Breaker could not be operated 
efficiently at 1973 coal prices. Id. at 580. Therefore, it determined that the market for this 
type of equipment was illiquid. Id. at 579. Second; the court seemed to think that an asset's 
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a debtor was not solvent "merely because [it] ... has assets with a 
fair market value which would permit [it] to pay [its] debts at some 
future time upon a liquidation of [its] business."65 Harking back to 
the Larrimer test, the court emphasized that solvency requires the 
"present" ability to pay one's debts as they mature.66 Thus, the 
Gleneagles approach means that fewer assets are likely to appear on 
the balance sheet. 67 
Gleneagles ensures a "less-cluttered" balance sheet of assets in 
LBOs involving capital-intensive companies.68 The assets of such 
companies are unlikely to count as assets for purposes of solvency 
because they cannot be sold with the requisite Gleneagles degree of 
promptness. Wholesale adoption of this standard would not only 
inhibit LBO transactions generally, it would also deprive owners of 
the capitalized value of their businesses. 
The Third Circuit Court's approval in United States v. Tabor 
Court Realty Corp. of the Gleneagles lower court's reasoning makes it 
difficult to argue that Gleneagles only applies the conventional, bank-
ruptcy "fair valuation" test. On appeal, the defendants urged the 
Third Circuit to apply a different valuation test. The defendants 
correctly pointed out to the court the narrow approach taken by 
other states. 69 The defendants argued that the district court had 
erroneously applied a standard of "immediate liquidation" rather 
than the standard of liquidation within a "reasonable time" followed 
by the overwhelming mcgority of courts.70 The Third Circuit was 
unimpressed. It dismissed the argument, curtly observing that the 
trial court had "applied the Larrimer criteria of Pennsylvania, not 
those of Montana and New York."71 The Third Circuit's remark is 
puzzling because Montana and New York, as well as Pennsylvania, 
purport to measure insolvency using a uniform test of "present fair 
salable value."72 
rapid salability would be affected by encumbrances on the asset. I d. Finally, the court consid-
ered that even if an asset could be sold fairly rapidly, it might be important to the operations 
of Target's business. Consequently, it would not be regarded as an asset available for payment 
of debts. Id. at 579-80. · 
65 Id. at 578. 
66 Id. 
67 Rosenberg reached a similar conclusion based on an analysis of the UFCA's "present 
fair salable value" standard. See Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 255; see also supra note 59. 
68 See Brief of Amicus Curiae, National Commercial Finance Ass'n, Inc. at 16, United 
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-5636). 
69 Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d at 1303. 
7o Id. 
71 Id. at 1304. 
72 See UFCA table of jurisdictions wherein Act has been adopted, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1990 
Supp.). 
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Unlike Larrimer and its progeny, most courts do not draw a 
distinction between the UFCA and Bankruptcy Code's tests of val-
uation.73 In applying the UFCA, most courts have not emphasized 
the words "present" and "salable" and therefore have not recog-
nized the sharp discount in value reflecting lack of liquidity that the 
words might suggest.74 Thus, most courts employ a valuation stan-
dard similar to that employed under the Bankruptcy Code; 
Despite its endurance for nearly a century/5 the bankruptcy 
test provides no precise standards for valuation other than that the 
valuation be "fair."76 The task of articulating a more precise stan-
dard has fallen on the courts. Not surprisingly, the courts have not 
formulated a clear and consistent standard of insolvency. 77 The task 
is beset with inherent difficulties. 
First, valuating a person's assets "at a specific time is at best an 
inexact science and may often be impossible."78 Consider, for ex-
ample, the discrepancies in valuation that can arise in appraising a 
single-family home. Second, valuation is usually decided on the basis 
of expert testimony. Although an expert is supposedly objective, 
reality suggests otherwise. The appraiser is often an advocate. 79 
73 See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 505 (N.D. Ill. 1988) 
("[f]air valuation is near enough in meaning to 'fair value of salable assets' to defeat defen-
dants' motion to dismiss"); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 394 F. Supp. 125, 129 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the definitions in the UFCA and in the Bankruptcy Code are substantially 
equival!!nt); United States v. 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) ("The standard to be applied under the [UFCA] is insolvency in the 'bankruptcy' 
sense."); see also Cieri, Leveraged Buyouts, supra note 1, at 361. 
74 See, e:g., Hyde Properties v. McCoy, 507 F.2d 301, 307 (6th Cir. 1974); Tri-Continental 
Leasing v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 500-01 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Cate v. Nicely (In re 
Knox Kreations), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 656 
F.2d 230, 231 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Kerr, 470 F. Supp. 278, 283 (E.D, Tenn. 
1978). 
75 The "fair valuation" standard has been the test of insolvency for bankruptcy purposes 
since 1898. See National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(15), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 
1978); see also 1 G. GLENN, supra note 8, § 272, at 465. This standard replaced the "equity" 
of "inability to pay debts as they mature" approach that was favored prigr to that time. 
76 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(3l)(A) (1988); see also American Nat'! Bank & Trust Co. v. Bone, 
333 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1964) ("[t]he statute describes the controlling standard of valuation 
with on brief phrase: 'fair"'). 
77 Compare the standard formulation of the test in Syracuse Engineering Co. v. Haight, 
110 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[a] proper regard for the interests of the bankrupt, as 
well as the interests of his creditors, compels the conclusion that fair market price is the most 
equitable standard") with Wienboldt Stores, 94 Bankr. 485, 505 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) ("[i]n 
determining 'fair valuation,' a court must consider the property's intrinsic value, selling value, 
and the earning power of the property"). 
78 Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1980); Emerald 
Hills Country Club v. Hollywood, Inc. (In re Emerald Hills Country Club, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 
408, 420 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983). 
79 Solk & Grant, Valuation Techniques for Closely-Held Enterprise, 92 CoM. LJ. 254, 256 
(1987). 
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Furthermore, the appraisal profession itselflacks internal consensus 
regarding the use of crucial valuation terminology.8° Courts often 
decide the valuation question by splitting the difference between 
the values asserted by the experts. 81 
In addition to the uncertainty that these factors contribute to 
valuation results, a fundamental legal question exists regarding "fair 
valuation." Most courts seem to agree that despite its fuzziness, the 
mandate of fair valuation is satisfied by estimating the amount for 
which an asset will exchange within a "reasonable time."82 This 
estimate is assumed to approximate an asset's "fair market value." 
The critical factor affecting valuation is the period of time 
assumed to be a "reasonable time."83 Thus, whether a debtor's assets 
received· "fair valuation" depends on the court's determination of 
the time within which a debtor can fairly be expected to liquidate 
its assets. In theory, arguably all courts agree that fair valuation is 
not synonymous with the valuation that would prevail at a sheriff's 
sale or forced sale. 84 In practice, however, despite disclaimers to the 
contrary, the results in Larrimer and Gleneagles appear to approach 
a forced-sale valuation of assets. 
Thus, one problem with fair valuation is that its "governing" 
standard of valuation is elastic and indeterminate. The shorter the 
time period within which a debtor is expected to liquidate assets, 
the more it approaches "liquidation" value; conversely, the longer 
the time period, the closer the valuation standard approximates the 
mandate of fair valuation. Because "reasonable time" can never be 
formulated precisely, it shrouds the determination of insolvency 
· with uncertainty. 85 
80 See id. The Jack of educational requirements and governmental certification proce-
dures governing entry into the appraisal profession has contributed to the "proliferation" of 
inconsistent valuation results. Id. 
81 Id. at 257 (citing Haynsworth, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 MERCER L. REv. 457, 
486 n.82 (1982), and authorities cited therein). 
82 See Briden vv. Foley, 776 F.2d 379, 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (reasonable time); Syracuse 
Eng'g Co. v. Haight, 110 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1940) (same); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. 
DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 430,436 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); Flynn 
v. Midamerican Bank & Trust Co. (In re Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc.), 81 Bankr. 1009, 1017 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1988); Jahn v. Reading Body Works, (In re Fassnacht & Sons), 45 Bankr. 
209, 217 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); First Nat'! Bank of Stiegler v. Perdue Hous. Indus., Inc. 
(In re Perdue Hous. Indus., Inc.), 437 F. Supp. 36, 38 (W.D. Okla. 1977). 
83 See supra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of fair valuation. See also 
Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1061, 1062 (1985) ("Valuation 
in bankruptcy is a function of time."); 5 T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAw, ~ 22.03[E), 
at 22-34 (1989) ("A longer period of time for sale may permit a diligent search for the best 
buyer and other promotional and marketing efforts ...• "). 
B< See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
85 See, e.g., In re Joe Flynn Rare Coins, Inc., 81 Bankr. at 1017 (noting the ambiguity of 
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2. Insolvency on a Going-Concern Value Basis 
A more fundamental uncertainty causing courts difficulty is 
whether the mandate of "fair valuation" incorporates the concept 
of "going-concern value" and, if so, the relationship between "going-
concern value" and fair market value.86 In other words, does insol-
vency refer to an excess of liabilities over assets in the event of a 
liquidation of a debtor's assets or does it refer to the debtor's in-
ability to pay its debts within a reasonable period of time while 
continuing its business?87 · 
The distinction is crucial. In the first case, the court assumes 
no future for an asset's relationship to the debtor's business, and it 
therefore values the asset based on that perspective. 88 Consequently, 
only assets that may be converted into cash within a reasonable time 
are included under the balance-sheet test. Asset values recorded on 
a debtor's balance sheet, although proper as accounting entries, are 
not determinative of fair market value. 89 
The assumption of liquidation is important in another respect. 
Liquidation usually implies that assets are to be sold piecemeal, with 
specific values assigned to specific assets.90 As a result, assets that 
have no independent value are disregarded. Intangibles such as 
customer lists, supply lines, distribution networks, and unpatented 
process technology are examples. Such assets, though valuable to a 
business, are inseparable from it. They are unlike tangible assets 
"fair valuation" with respect to the standard by which assets should be valued); Virginia Nat'l 
Bank v. Jones, 5 Bankr. 736, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) ("True value is an elusive pimper-
nel."); see also Baird & Jackson, supra note 8, at 840-41, in which the authors argue for 
excluding LBOs from coverage under fraudulent transfer law because of the uncertainty 
inherent in value determinations. 
86 Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 56 
Bankr. 339, 385 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). · 
87 Bonright & Pickett, supra note 44, at 591; see Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 83 at 
1063, stating the "[t]he choice between 'liquidation values' and 'going concerns values' lies at 
the heart of most disputes over asset valuation in bankruptcy." 
88 Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 83, at 1064 (defining "liquidation value" as the value 
an asset will bring at a sale less the cost of selling it). Although most courts use "liquidation 
value" interchangeably with "forced-sale value," others use it in the sense of fair market 
value. Compare In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 56 Bankr. at 385 (liquidation value equals distressed 
sale price) with Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 577 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(balance sheet test "focuses ... on the liquidation value of the debtor's assets compared to 
his liabilities"). 
89 See, e.g., F.S. Bowen Electric Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 256 F.2d 
46, 49 (4th Cir. 1958). 
90 See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles lnv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 579-80 (M.D. Pa. 
1983), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), 
Cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). 
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because they possess no residual value after the business ceases to 
exist.91 
On the other hand, if valuation assumes a debtor will continue 
in business as a going concern, an asset's value is better reflected by 
its indirect contribution to the earnings of a business rather than 
by its ability to be sold and the proceeds to be used to pay debts. 
The American Accounting Association explains the assumptions 
underlying the "going concern" concept: 
The "going concern" concept assumes the continuance of 
the general enterprise situation. In the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, the entity is viewed as remaining in 
operation indefinitely. Although it is recognized that busi-
ness activities and economic conditions are changing con-
standy, the concept assumes that controlling environmen-
tal circumstances will persist sufficiendy far into the future 
to permit existing plans and programs to be carried to 
completion. Thus the assets of the enterprise are expected 
to have continuing usefulness for the general purpose for 
which they are required .... 92 
"Going-concern" valuation requires determining the market 
value of an ongoing business as a whole. 93 It measures the business's 
plans, programs and assets, tangible as well as intangible, all of 
which contribute to its earnings. This valuation approach assumes 
that an ongoing business includes an additional element of value 
because the assets, viewed as a whole and as part of a business, 
significandy contribute to the enterprise's income-producing activ-
ities. This approach reflects the assumption that the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts. Therefore, although the case law evinces 
confusion regarding the relationship between going-concern value 
91 Cross, Intangible Assets: Extra Comfort for the LBO Lender, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, 
Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 47. Patents and copyrights, however, are a different matter because they 
can be separated from the business and retain value even after the business ceases to exist. 
Id. Cross suggests that the most important factor that accounts for the difference between 
target's net book value and its purchase price is the existence of nonseparable intangible 
assets. Id. 
92 See G. NEWTON, BANKRUPTCY AccOUNTING AND INSOLVENCY AcCOUNTING: PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURES 500-01 (2d ed. 1981) (quoting AAA COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS 
AND STANDARDS, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS AND PRECEDING STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS at 2). 
93 In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 56 Bankr. 339, 386 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (citing 
Atlanta Knitting Mills v. Nathason Bros. Co. (In re Nathason Bros. Co.), 64 F.2d 912, 913 
(6th Cir. 1933)). 
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and market value, "going-concern" value seems to represent simply 
one measure of fair market value. 94 
Application of the "going-concern" standard can sometimes be 
misleading, however. A court's acceptance of this standard as the 
appropriate one in a given case does not preclude the court from 
declining to use it to value specific assets. For example, in deter-
mining Target's solvency, the court in Ohio Corrugating Co. approved 
"going-concern" valuation for inventory, but rejected its use for 
machinery and equipment.95 The court adopted a "nuts and bolts" 
appraisal for the machinery and equipment because it found that 
this latter approach more nearly reflected a proportional amount 
of the eventual sale price of all assets of the company.96 
If consistently understood and applied, "going-concern" values 
generally exceed liquidation values. Another recent LBO case illus-
trates the difference in results produced by these two competing 
approaches. In Kupetz v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust 
Co.,97 the court disapproved the valuation results that flowed from 
the assumption that Target was being liquidated. Under this as-
sumption, the appraiser had valued Target's receivables at seventy-
five percent of their face value.98 In Kupetz, the court found that 
Target collected most of its receivables within forty-five days because 
of the financial strength of its customers.99 Therefore, the court 
indicated that if Target had been viewed from the perspective of a 
going concern, the receivables would have been valued at face value 
or at a much lower discount rate. 100 
94 See id. 
95 91 Bankr. 430, 437-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
96 I d. at 438. 
97 77 Bankr. 754, 762-63 (C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
98 I d. at 762-63. Accounts receivable may be discounted from their face value if their 
collectibility is in doubt. Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 577 (1st 
Cir. 1980). Collectibility is assessed in light of the accdunt debtors' track record of payment, 
their current solvency, and whether the account debt is in dispute. I d. 
99 Kupetz, 77 Bankr. at 762-63. 
1oo See id. Other cases involving the appropriate discount rate for valuing receivables 
have reached similar results viewing the debtor as a going concern. See, e.g., Roemelmeyer 
v. Walter E. Heller & Co. (In re Lackow Bros.), 752 F.2d 1529, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985). In this 
case, the trustee in bankruptcy sought to avoid as preferential, payments made to the creditor 
during the preferential period. Whether the payments were preferential critically depended 
on the standard of valuation the court applied: going-concern value or liquidation value. I d. 
at 1531. In deciding to use going-concern value, the court found significant that, in making 
additional loans, the creditor relied on the values of inventory and accounts indicated in 
debtor's "computer printouts." Id. 
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The impact of valuation on a "going-concern" basis can be even 
more dramatic. Kupetz again demonstrates that effect. A "going-
concern" perspective not only increases the value of specific assets 
but also serves to determine if something qualifies for inclusion on 
Target's balance sheet. In Kupetz, for example, Target operated a 
showroom in which it displayed mannequins and other garment 
display forms it. manufactured. The appraiser viewed Target's lease 
obligations as a liability.101 Similarly, the appraiser viewed certain of 
Target's third party consulting contracts as additional liabilities. 102 
The appraiser's view flowed from its assumption that Target was to 
be liquidated. The court suggested that viewed from the "going-
concern" assumption, the lease might have been sold or otherwise 
been of value to Target; the consulting contracts similarly would 
have had value to Target.103 To that extent, such value would be 
property to be considered as an asset in determining Target's sol-
vency. 
Another LBO case indicates a radically different approach to 
determining "going-concern" value. In In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, 
Inc. v. Byrne, the court stated that a business's "going-concern" value 
is the appropriate standard to measure Target's solvency. 104 The 
traditional method for determining enterprise value under this 
standard requires the capitalization of income or earnings. 105 It 
assumes that the value of a business lies in its ability to provide a 
future stream of income. Under this approach, as under the "asset 
appraisal" approach, solvency remains a function of whether Tar-
get's assets exceed its liabilities. Under this method, however, it is 
the capitalized value of the business that constitutes the asset column 
on Target's balance sheet. 106 
Determining a company's capitalized value is not an easy mat-
ter. It involves two basic steps. The appraiser first must select an 
appropriate net profit figure that represents the enterprise's annual 
earning capacity.107 To arrive at this figure, the appraiser must 
101 Kupetz, 77 Bankr. at 763. 
102 Jd. 
1os Id. 
104 100 Bankr. 127, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
105 Id. at 132. 
106 Muskegon Motor Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Davis (In re Muskegon Motor 
Specialties), 366 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1966) ("In bankruptcy, a finding of insolvency is 
arrived at by a comparison of the assets (here being the capitalized value of future earnings) 
with liabilities."): 
107 Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100 
Bankr. 127, 132 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); Queenan, supra note 82, at 39-40. 
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calculate projections of future sales and estimates of profit margins 
on sales. 108 The appraiser reaches its estimate of sales and profit 
margins based on a detailed analysis of the company's operating 
history in light of current trends or factors. 109 The appraiser then 
multiplies this net figure by an appropriate capitalization rate or 
"multiplier."110 
The most difficult part of determining business value involves 
selecting the appropriate capitalization rate. No criteria exist to 
guide this decision. m The absence of criteria reflects a lack of 
consensus regarding the various factors that contribute to the risks 
associated within an enterprise and the industry to which it belongs. 
Despite the inherent difficulties in selecting a risk figure, which is 
what the capitalization rate represents, the capitalization rate reflects 
the product of two variables: the going or market interest rate for 
a riskless loan at the time, and the appraiser's judgment of the 
degree of risk regarding the particular business.112 
Although courts frequently use the capitalization of income 
method to determine a debtor's solvency in bankruptcy reorgani-
zation, 113 no court has used it to determine liability in a fraudulent 
transfer context. Thus, Vadnais's inclination to use the capitalization 
of income method in the context of an LBO represents a significant 
development. There is no reason why it should not be applied in 
the LBO context. 
108 In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d at 526. 
109 G. NEWTON, supra note 92, at 375. 
110 In re Muskegon Motor Specialties, 366 F.2d at 526, 527. 
Ill See Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1453, 
1467 (1966) ("[t]he multiplier is likely to represent the point of greatest disparity between 
the contending parties because of the absence of objective criteria by which to measure it 
and because a very small variation will result in a significant difference in the final appraisal 
value"). 
112 G. NEWTON, supra note 92, at 378. Assume, for example, a business's estimated future 
income is $900,000 per year. This predicted future income must then be reduced to present 
value by use of a discount rate. The discount rate reflects "both the time period before the 
[predicted future income] will be realized and the uncertainty as to what the actual [income] 
will be." Schaefer, The Fallacy of Weigh[t]ing Asset Value and Earnings Value in the Appraisal of 
Corporate Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1031, 1037 (1982). ·Now if we assume that 10% is the 
appropriate discount rate, the capitalized value of the business is $2,000,000 [1 divided by 
10% x 100,000]. If the business was much riskier, calling for a discount rate of 20%, the 
value of the business would be half as much [1 divided by 20% x 200,000]. The higher the 
business risk, the higher the discount rate, the smaller the capitalization rate, and the lower 
the value of a business. 
115 See In re Muskegon Motor Specialties; 366 F.2d at 526. See generally Queenan, supra note 
44, at 43-49. 
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C. Valuation of Liabilities 
The problems of valuation are not unique to assets; courts must 
also value liabilities. The UFCA, UFTA, and the Bankruptcy Code 
all similarly define liabilities. 114 Each statute defines liabilities in the 
broadest possible manner to cover all debts whether liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, or absolute. Accordingly, courts 
have interpreted liabilities broadly to include debts barred by the 
statute of limitations, pending lawsuits (even if they later prove 
unfounded), pending claims (regardless of their merit), and contin-
gent claims. 115 Judicial inquiry is plenary regarding the includability 
of a particular liability in a "debtor's balance sheet. Thus, a debtor's 
particular accounting method does not circumscribe or foreclose 
judicial inquiry.116 The underlying purpose of fraudulent transfer 
law to prevent a debtor from defrauding its creditors explains both 
the judicial reluctance to be bound by a debtor's own practice and 
the elasticity available to construe liabilities. Therefore, courts have 
regarded an expansive conception of liabilities and close judicial 
scrutiny as necessary to accomplish this salutary objective.117 
1. Valuation of Unmatured Obligations 
The definition of liabilities, however, leaves unanswered several 
valuation questions. For example, should the liability on an unma-
tured obligation be calculated by its face value or be discounted to 
reflect its present value? 118 None of the fraudulent transfer statutes 
addresses this issue. For example, even though the Bankruptcy 
Code requires the estimation of an unliquidated claim for purposes 
of determining its allowed amount in bankruptcy, it does not contain 
any comparable provision regarding valuation of liabilities. As a 
114 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A), (11) (1988); UFCA § I, 7A U.L.A. 430 (1985); UFTA 
§ 1(5), (3), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985). 
115 See Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 499-501 (N.D. 
Cal. 1980). 
116 See, e.g., F.S. Bowen Electric Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 256 F.2d 
46, 49 (4th Cir. 1958). But see Joshua Slocum, Ltd. v. Boyle (In re Joshua Slocum, Ltd.), 103 
Bankr. 610, 623-24 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (assigning weight to a debtor's treatment of 
liabilities according to GAAP). 
117 See, e.g., Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 485 F. Supp. at 500. 
118 See Carlson, supra note 3, at 90; Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 83, at 1094-95; 
Bonright & Pickett, supra note 44, at 593-94. 
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result, all unmatured liabilities are accelerated and allowed in their 
full face amount, without regard to interest rate or maturity date. 119 
Computing unmatured obligations in this manner is erroneous 
because it ignores the discount problem that can significantly affect 
the solvency calculation of Target. The present value of an unma-
tured debt is less than its face amount if the contract rate of interest 
is less than the market rate of interest. Although an LBO lender 
will rarely offer more favorable interest terms than the market rate, 
the contract rate may well be lower than the market rate in certain 
cases because the financing lender enjoys institutional and transac-
tion cost advantages.12° For example, in Credit Managers Association 
v. Federal Co. 121 a parent company sold its subsidiary to the subsid-
iary's management.122 Management gave the parent a promissory 
note for the purchase price at an interest rate much lower than the 
prevailing market rate. 123 The court discounted the face amount of 
the LBO debt from $1.2 million to its present value of $900,000.124 
Although Credit Managers did not involve the issue of Target's 
solvency, its holding has significant ramifications in that regard. It 
indicates that it would be erroneous in calculating solvency to accord 
liabilities their face values. If the question of solvency were a ques-
tion of Target's ability to pay all its debts at once, regardless of their 
maturity dates, counting liabilities at their face values would no 
doubt be accurate. 125 But that result assumes Target's business has 
very limited or no future. If one assumes Target is a going concern, 
however, not all of its debts would be due and payable in their face 
amount. 126 Therefore, if a "going-concern" perspective more ap-
119 Fortgang & Mayer,·supra note 83, at 1094-95 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. 353 (1977) and S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1978). 
12o See Carlson, supra note 3, at 90. 
121 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
122 Id. at 177. 
12S See id. at 177-78. 
124 Id. at 179. 
125 Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr. 754, 762 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1987) ("[The Appraiser] used questionable methods in appraising the solvency of [Tar-
get] after the sale. He maintained liabilities at their full value, but discounted assets .... "); 
Bonright & Pickett, supra note 44, at 594 (stating that it is unjustifiable to count liabilities at 
full value if the business is a going concern). 
126 See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 83, at 1066 (pointing out the distinction between 
GAAP and insolvency or liquidation accounting and noting that it is only in the latter case 
that liabilities must be treated as due and payable in their face amount); Verner, supra note 
34, at 22!> (indicating that such an approach would "declare insolvent a substantial proportion 
of the business and professional entities of the nation"). 
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propriately captures Target's situation, Target's liabilities for pur-
poses of the solvency calculation should be properly discounted. 
2. Contingent Liabilities 
A related valuation problem concerns the status and treatment 
of contingent liabilities. For example, often an LBO involves an 
upstream guarantee in which a shell parent corporation causes 
Target to guarantee repayment of the funds parent borrowed to 
purchase Target's stock. Should Target's guarantee liability be val-
ued at its face amount or should it be discounted to reflect the 
probability that the guarantee obligation will materialize? None of 
the fraudulent transfer statutes addresses this valuation problem, 
other than to provide that contingent liabilities be included in cal-
culating solvency. 127 As a general proposition, valuing contingent 
liabilities at their face amount would be erroneous.128 Every entity 
against whom a lawsuit has been commenced faces "contingent" 
liability. Every bank that has issued a letter of credit does so as well. 
By definition, such liabilities are not certain and even may be un-
likely to occur. Thus, they should be discounted by the probability 
that the contingency will materialize.129 For example, if the proba-
bility of occurrence of a contingency is ten percent, the face amount 
of the liability should be reduced by ninety percent. 
In the case of an LBO structured as an upstream guarantee, 
does it make sense to discount the face amount of the guarantee 
liability? In In re Knox Kreations, the United States District Court of 
the Eastern District of Tennessee reversed the bankruptcy judge's 
decision to include the face amount of Target's guarantee obliga-
tion.130 In so doing, the court relied on the UFCA's "probable 
liability" language.131 Despite the holding in Knox Kreations that "a 
contingent liability should be discounted," discounting an LBO ob-
ligation when it is structured as an upstream guarantee may not 
127 See supra note 114 for the cited statutes. 
128 See In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 199 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Chase 
Manhattan Bank (N.A.) v. Oppenheim, 109 Misc. 2d 649, 651, 652, 440 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Marine Midland Bank v. Stein, 105 Misc. 2d 768, 770, 433 N.Y.S.2d 
325, 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); see also supra text accompanying notes 115-17 for a discussion 
of the expansive manner in which courts have construed "liabilities." 
129 In re Xonics Photochemical, Inc. 841 F.2d at 200. 
13° Cate v. Nicely (In re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 
1979). 
151 See id.; see also UFCA; § 2, 7A U.L.A. 442 (defining insolvency as debtor's "probable 
liability" on existing debts exceeding assets). 
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make sense. After all, is it meaningful in such Circumstances to 
describe Target's liability as "contingent?" In such LBOs, the re-
payment obligation really falls on Target (the guarantor) rather 
than on the primary obligors (the buyers). The latter are only 
conduits through whom repayments are made. Unless they have 
assets or income of their own, the buyers inevitably and invariably 
rely on Target to discharge the obligation they incurred.132 The 
LBO's structure as a guarantee obligation should not hide the eco-
nomic reality of the transaction. In reality, the obligation is contin-
gent in name only, not in fact. 
The court's contrary suggestion in In re Knox Kreations is un-
convincing.133 The Knox court suggested that the LBO participants 
anticipated that Target would generate enough revenue to enable 
the buyers themselves to pay the debt load; that is, if the buyer-
primary obligor-earned positive income from Target's operations, 
the likelihood that Target would pay the obligation's full face 
amount was less than one hundred percent. But because a lender's 
decision to call the upstream guarantee depends on Target's success 
in producing positive income, it defies common sense to characterize 
Target's obligation as "secondary." 
Moreover, the theory the Knox court applied to discount Tar-
get's guarantee obligation raises a further problem. If an LBO debt 
structured as an upstream guarantee is discounted to reflect its 
contingency, the same rationale should apply to discount similar 
debt incurred in LBOs structured differently. Suppose a shell cor-
poration assumes the obligation to repay the LBO loan at the outset. 
The shell corporation then merges with Target, which is the sur-
viving entity. In such a case, by definition, there is no "contingent" 
obligation. Yet, the economic reality of the transaction is the same 
in each case: the LBO participants expect the loan to be repaid with 
income generated by Target's operations. Target bears the entire 
burden of the obligation. Thus, a discount should be made only if 
the primary obligor has assets or income of its own wholly separate 
from those of Target, or if other guarantors also exist. Otherwise, 
•s2 See United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 578 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd 
sub nom. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) ("[The LBO buyer] had no source of income and intended to 
use the assets of [Target] to pay the interest and principal on the [LBO] loans. These debts 
therefore constitute an obligation of [Target]."). 
tss But see Carlson, supra note 3, at 91 (arguing that a contingent guarantee in an LBO 
should be discounted by the probability that the guarantee will never be called if the LBO 
buyer earns positive income from Target's operations). -
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the law will encourage LBO participants to structure the LBO as a 
guarantee because such structure will advantageously affect any 
later solvency calculation. This advantage will arise even though the 
structure adopted has nothing to do with the substance of the 
transaction from the point of view of fraudulent transfer law. 
Another issue in valuing liabilities involves convertible debt 
securities.134 Such instruments have debt and equity features. 
Therefore, the debt portion clearly represents liability to Target. 
Because of ambiguities in the case law, 135 however, the entire face 
value of these instruments may be considered in computing Target's 
balance sheet.136 
!I. STANDARDS USED TO DETERMINE UNREASONABLY SMALL 
CAPITAL 
The second test of the validity of an LBO is whether it left 
Target with an "unreasonably small ~apital" with which it may carry 
on its business or later transactions.137 The insolvency test of fraud-
ulent transfer law condemns Target's transfer to protect creditors 
who hold claims against it at the time of the LBO. Target's failure 
to maintain a reasonable amount of capital injures and thus is 
voidable by existing creditors as well as subsequent ones. 
134 Mavredakis & Greene, How a Deal Can Come Back to Haunt a Seller, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 70. 
Iss See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968). Courts 
use a number of criteria to determine whether an investment represents debt or equity: 
(1) the intent of the parties; (2) the identity between creditors and shareholders; 
(3) the extent of participation in management by the holder of the instrument; 
(4) the ability of the corporation to obtain funds from outside sources; (5) the 
'thinness' of the capital structure in relation to debt; (6) the risk involved; (7) 
the formal indicia of the arrangement; (8) the relative position of the obligees 
as to other creditors regarding the payment of interest and principal; (9) the 
voting power of the holder of the instrument; (10) the provision of a fixed rate 
of interest; (11) a contingency on the obligation to repay; (12) the source of the 
interest payments; (13) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date; (14) a 
provision for redemption by the corporation; (15) a provision for redemption 
at the option of the holder; and (16) the timing of the advance with reference 
to the organization of the corporation. 
Id. at 696. 
Iss See, e.g., Joshua Slocum, LTD v. Boyle (In re Joshua Slocum, LTD), 103 Bankr. 610, 
622-23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (trustee arguing that redemption price for mandatorily 
redeemable stock should be counted as debt in determining whether transfers made to 
corporation president under an employment termination agreement were fraudulent). 
1s7 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988); UFCA § 5, 7A U.L.A. 427, 504 (1985); UFTA 
§ 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 639, 653 (1985). 
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Unlike "insolvency," however, "unreasonably small capital" is 
not statutorily defined. Given its importance in fraudulent transfer 
law, some courts have expressed surprise at this lack of definition. 138 
Yet even the UFTA, the latest effort in modernizing fraudulent 
transfer law, fails to state a statutory definition. The UFTA did 
break new ground, however, by substituting "unreasonably small 
assets" for "unreasonably small capital," to clarify that the special 
meaning of capital in corporate law has no relevance to fraudulent 
transfer law.139 Beyond this modification, little agreement exists 
among courts regarding the meaning of either "capital" or "unrea-
sonable amounts" of it. Cases reveal two broad approaches. 
A. Approaches to the Determinatipn of Unre~onably Small Capital 
1. Pledging All of Debtor's Assets/Insolvency 
The first approach equates "unreasonably small capital" with 
the pledging of all or substantially all of a debtor's assets. In the 
seminal case of Diller v. Irving Trust Co. (In re College Chemists, Inc.), 140 
Diller sold all the shares of her company, College Chemists Inc., to 
Weiner.141 Weiner promised to pay the purchase price and secured 
that promise by granting a purchase money security interest in all 
of the company's assets. The district court affirmed the referee's 
decision that the security interest was void because it left the com-
pany with "unreasonably small capital."142 In affirming the avoid-
ance, the Second Circuit found it significant that the company's 
liabilities exceeded the value of its assets. As a result, the court easily 
concluded that the company was left with not just "unreasonably 
•ss See, e.g., Spanier v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 623 P.2d. 19, 24 (Ariz. 
App. 1980). The absence of a statutory definition, however, may not be too surprising. The 
amount of capital a business requires for its operations is so bound up with the particular 
nature of each business that articulating an abstract definition applicable across the board 
may prove difficult or even unhelpful. Cases construing the "unreasonably small capital" 
provision have clearly recognized that corporate undercapitalization is a question of fact to 
be determined on a case by case basis. See Barrett v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 
882 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989) (discussing the relativity inherent in the term and the need for 
inquiry to focus on the nature of each individual enterprise and its need for capital); Wells 
Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693, 697 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd, 
633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980) (case by case determination required); Jenney v. Vining, 415 
A.2d 681, 683 (N.H. 1980) (same). 
1s9 UFTA § 4 comment 4, 7A U.L.A. 654. 
140 62 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1933) (per curiam). 
141 Id. at 1058. 
142 Id. 
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small capital" but with no "capital at all."143 Whether the vice con-
demned in In re College Chemists, Inc. is insolvency, or the pledge of 
all of a company's assets, which resulted in insolvency, is unclear. 
In Sharrer v. Sandlas, 144 a New York appellate decision, the 
shareholders of a closely-held corporation sold their stock and took 
a security interest in all the corporation's assets to secure the de-
ferred portion of the purchase price.145 Unlike In re College Chemists, 
Inc., Target's debt did not exceed the value of its assets so that 
Target was not rendered insolvent. Nevertheless, the court relied 
on In re College Chemists, Inc. to conclude that Target was "effec-
tively" left with no capital because all of its assets were encum-
bered.146 
Similarly, in Teitlebaum v. Vos:5 (In re Tuller's, Inc.), 147 the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it unnecessary to decide 
whether the debtor was rendered insolvent in a similar transac-
tion.148 The court held that the transaction was invalid because all 
the corporate assets had been mortgaged.149 Under this reasoning, 
virtually all corporate buyouts will be per se fraudulent when the 
selling shareholders finance the acquisition because the effect of the 
transaction is to leave little or no unencumbered assets. 
Pirrone v. Toboroff (In re Vaniman International, Inc.)l 50 suggests 
that what is offensive is not so much the all-encompassing pledge 
as it is the lack of remaining equity in the assets encumbered. 
Vaniman involved a seller-financed corporate buyout in which the 
fair market value of the corporate assets exceeded its liabilities by 
a narrow margin just before the corporation placed a second mort-
gage on its assets to secure the purchase price of its own stock.151 
The effect of the second mortgage was to convert the corporation's 
existing thin surplus into a relatively large deficit. The court found 
this "minus capitalization" a sufficient basis for concluding that the 
corporation was left with "unreasonably small capital."152 It rea-
soned that the effect of the corporation's "minus capitalization" was 
143 Id. 
144 103 A.D.2d 873, 477 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1984). 
1<5 Id. at 873, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 898. 
146 /d. at 873-74, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 899. 
147 480 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1973). 
148 See id. at 51. 
149 Id. at 52. 
150 22 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
15 1 Id. at 177. 
1s2 Id. at 186. 
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to close off its only source of additional financing. 153 The court 
implicitly assumed that a company without unencumbered assets or 
sufficient equity in encumbered assets would be unlikely to obtain 
credit. 
A related line of cases is more explicit in this regard. These 
cases hold that a finding of insolvency also supports a finding of 
"unreasonably small capital."154 Although this branch of caselaw 
does not refer to In re College Chemists and its adherents, the courts' 
reasoning is the same. Whether a debtor's insolvency results from 
pledging all of its assets or otherwise, the debtor wili be left with 
"no capital" with which to operate its business. Therefore, these 
courts view insolvency by definition as establishing "unreasonably 
small capital." 
2. "Working Capital"/Cash Flow 
A second major line of cases has construed "unreasonably small 
capital" to mean "working capital" adequate for the business in 
which a debtor is engaged.155 Although the cases do not clearly 
articulate a definition of "working capital," the opinions seem to 
refer to a debtor's ability to raise sufficient cash resources to operate 
its business.156 
For example, in Wells- Fargo Bank v. Desert View Building Supplies, 
Inc., 151 the parent corporation caused its subsidiary to borrow funds 
and to secure the loan with its assets. 158 The subsidiary used the 
loan proceeds to pay off the parent's debt. The court found that 
the subsidiary was marginally profitable before its secured borrow-
ing. It also found that the debt service had taken a company that 
had a retained earnings of $280,000 and placed it in a situation 
where it had little cash resources to operate its business. 159 Although 
15S Id. 
154 See United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 580 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd 
sub nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), ;ert. denied, 
483 U.S. 1005 (1987); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76 Bankr. 523, 529 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1987); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752, 756 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Spanier v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 623 P.2d 19, 24 (Ariz. 
App. 1980). A recent case suggests that proof. of solvency will likewise establish reasonable 
capitalization. Pinto v. Philadelphia Fresh Food Terminal Corp. (In re Pinto), 89 Bankr. 486, 
501 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). 
155 See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases. 
156 Id. 
157 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), aff'd mem., 633 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1980). 
158 Id. at 695. 
1s9 Id. at 695, 697. 
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the company contended that it was able to continue its operations 
at the same yearly gross and obtain trade credit without difficulty, 
the court focused on the fact that the company's cash on hand was 
"extremely low."160 
In Zuk v. Zale, 161 a special master found the debtor had $5,000 
in "working capital" at the time of the challenged transfer.162 The 
evidence showed the debtor's general contracting business normally 
required $7,000 to $13,000 of working capital. The court found 
$5,000 sufficient working capital if "paymen;ts for work completed 
[by the debtor] came in each month."163 The court found it signif-
icant that current payments by customers allowed the debtor to 
finance its operations from current receipts. The court seemed to 
think the adequacy of a debtor's capital should be evaluated by its 
expected cash flow, i.e., whether his cash receipts would be sufficient 
to cover debts. 
In both Wells Fargo Bank and Zuk, the debtors were "balance-
sheet solvent" at the time of the challenged transfer.164 Thus, the 
question of whether positive cash flow would negate balance sheet 
insolvency was never before these courts. Some cases suggest, how-
ever, that the amount of capital sufficient to preclude invalidation 
under the "unreasonably small capital" standard cannot be deter-
mined merely by valuing a debtor's equity in property at one point 
in time.165 
In Widett v. George, 166 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court indicated that the market value of the debtor's equity 
was less significant than the "good prospects" of debtor's business. 167 
The debtor in Widett operated a restaurant whose relevant charac-
teristics, according to the court, were a prompt turnover of inven-
tories and cash payments by customers. 168 The court believed the 
restaurant might reasonably expect to finance its operations pri-
marily from current receipts.l69 
160 Id. at 697. 
161 114 N.H. 813, 330 A.2d 448 (1974). 
162 Id. at 816, 330 A.2d at 450. 
16' Id. at 816, 330 A.2d at 451. 
164 See Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693, 695 (D. 
Nev. 1978); Zuk, 114 N.H. at 816, 330 A.2d at 451. 
165 See Barrett v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 882 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989). 
166 336 Mass. 746, 148 N.E.2d 172 (1958). 
167 Id. at 750, 148 N.E.2d at 175. 
168 Id. at 751, 148 N.E.2d at 175. 
169 I d. Another court strongly suggests that insolvency may matter little "if a corporation 
is actively pursuing its regular business with a reasonable expectation that business conditions 
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In determining the reasonableness of a debtor's capital, recent 
cases have given decisive importance to the debtor's cash flow ex-
pectation. In Credit Managers Association v. Federal Co.,170 the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California rejected 
the negative implications of unfavorable balance sheet ratios and 
instead focused on a detailed cash flow analysis. 171 Credit Managers 
involved a management-led LBO of a subsidiary of the Federal 
Company.172 The management caused the subsidiary to execute a 
promissory note for $1.2 million, which represented the deferred 
portion of the purchase price for the subsidiary's stock. As part of 
the transaction, the management also caused the subsidiary to pay 
off more than seven million dollars of intercompany debt to its 
parent.173 It accomplished this transaction by borrowing that 
amount from General Electric Credit Corporation (GECC). As se-
curity for the loan and the deferred portion of the purchase price, 
the subsidiary pledged virtually all of its assets. Unable to raise 
sufficient cash to continue its operations, it failed a year and one 
half later. Nevertheless, the court held that the LBO did not leave 
the company with "unreasonably small capital" because its cash flow 
expectations were reasonable. 174 
Credit Managers' detailed attention to and reliance on cash flow 
projections to measure adequate capitalization is significant. The 
court clearly rejected the assumptions implicit in the cases that find 
a business unreasonably capitalized merely because its assets are 
fully encumbered. Accordingly, under Credit Managers, a company's 
mortgaging of all its assets is not dispositive as long as the company 
entertains reasonable expectations of staying in business and raising 
enough cash from operations and other sources to service its debt. 
In Credit Managers, the plaintiffs sought to establish that the absence 
of unencumbered assets made additional borrowings impossible.175 
The .court, however, found GECC had agreed to increase its line of 
credit by $2.5 million even after the LB0.176 GECC made the de-
cision to provide additional credit after convincing itself of the 
will improve and that it will be re-established on a sound financial condition." Telefest, Inc. 
v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 (D.N.J. 1984). 
11o 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
171 Id. at 187. 
172 Id. at 177. 
11s Id. at 178. 
174 Id. at 187. 
175 Id. at 186. 
176 Id. at 184. 
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strength of the debtor's cash flow. 177 Consequently, the court con-
cluded the debtor's cash flow was reasonable. 
Credit Managers is significant in another respect. In determining 
whether Target's cash flow was adequate, the court did not focus 
on whether expectations were actually met, but rather on whether 
they were reasonable in light of the circumstances existing at the 
time of the LB0.178 The court concluded that unexpected occur-
rences that frustrated the expectations would not be sufficient to 
disprove such occurren:ces if it was reasonable to assume the non-
occurrence of the frustrating event. Thus, Credit Managers shifts the 
risk of such occurrences from Target and the LBO lender to the 
creditors of the company. 
Ill. THE CHOICE OF APPROACH: WHAT LIES BEHIND IT? 
The preceding two sections discussed the basic approaches that 
courts use to determine a debtor's financial condition in the context 
of an LBO. Clearly, the process of determining financial condition 
is far less objective than it might first appear. In the LBO context 
particularly, the court's view of the reach of fraudulent transfer law 
significantly influences its determination of financial condition. In 
other words, lurking behind the differences in approach is a dif-
ference in judicial opinion regarding whether creditors or LBO 
participants should more fairly assume the loss from a failed LBO. 
Courts more solicitous of creditors than LBO participants are more 
likely to employ an approach that gives effect to such solicitude. 
Conversely, courts that entertain serious reservations about apply-
ing the constructive fraud provisions to an LBO context are likely 
to apply these provisions in ways that allocate the risk of loss from 
such transactions to creditors of Target. 
A. judicial Use of Broad Standards to Protect Creditors over Equity 
Owners 
A fundamental debtor duty under the fraudulent transfer law 
is to respect the rights of creditors.179 Consistent with this duty, a 
debtor must give "primacy" to the interests of creditors before its 
own when it transfers property or incurs an obligation.180 An LBO 
177 Id. at 183-84. 
178 Id. at 184, 187. 
179 See Clark, supra note 6, at 510. 
180 See id. at 510-11. 
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not only offers opportunities for purposive disregard of the duty, 
it can also leave creditors in the cold. In effect, no matter how an 
LBO is structured, it allows selling shareholders to liquidate their 
investments so that, unless Target is left with enough assets, the 
shareholders will have preferred themselves at the expense of cred-
itors, contrary to the order of priorities established by de jure liq-
uidation.181 Thus, a court that views the likely effects of an LBO as 
reversing the normal order of priorities may be equally likely to 
assess Target's financial condition under restrictive, stringent tests 
that will ensure that creditors' rights are not unfairly subordinated 
to those of the selling shareholders. 
Gleneagles illustrates a court that viewed the LBO as having 
provided Target's selling ~hareholders with "cozy accommodations" 
at the expense of creditors.182 In Gleneagles, the court concluded 
that the transaction was both intentionally and constructively fraud-
ulent. In reaching the conclusion that the LBO was constructively 
fraudulent, the court applied a valuation standard of "immediate 
liquidation."183 
Although one could argue that the court was simply following 
well-established precedent in assessing Target's solvency on a broad 
standard, one cannot avoid the conclusion that more than mere 
stare decisis was involved in the unflinching application of those 
criteria. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the court's finding 
of intentional fraud carried over to and colored its analysis of the 
solvency issue. It would have been extremely difficult and even 
disingenuous to keep the impact of the intentional fraud finding 
from spilling over in to the constructive fraud analysis. Further-
more, it is difficult to explain why the court lent its prestige to the 
use of a liquidation standard at odds with the overwhelming au-
thority in the country.184 
JBJ See Smyser, supra note 9, at 807-08. 
182 See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1293, 1297 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); see also United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. 
Supp. 556, 584 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (holding the selling shareholders liable for breach of their 
duty of loyalty to creditors by undertaking the LBO when a prudent person would have 
discovered from the precarious nature of Target's financial condition that the LBO would 
injure creditors). 
Jss See supra text accompanying notes 35-72 for a discussion of Gleneagles. 
184 See supra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantive equiva-
lence of meaning courts ascribe to the UFCA and Bankruptcy Code tests of fair valuation. 
Indeed, one court has dismissed as "hypertechnical" the apparent distinction between the 
Bankruptcy Code's "fair valuation" and the UFCA's "present fair salable value" standards. 
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bank. 488, 505 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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Equally significant in the use of such a standard is the cast of 
players standing on both sides of the LBO. On one side stood 
existing creditors who, prior to the LBO, were owed about eight 
million dollars in delinquent obligations, including federal taxes, 
property taxes, pension fund, and employee welfare fund obliga-
tions.185 On the other side stood the existing shareholders and the 
secured lender who expected the loan to be repaid from the liqui-
dation of assets, not the company's cash flow. 186 Not only had Target 
been in financial trouble prior to the LBO, its future was equally 
bleak. For example, its cash flow was insufficient to meet its obli-
gations and much of it was earmarked for servicing the LBO debt 
load. In light of these factors, the court must have found it ine-
quitable to allow LBO participants to benefit from the transaction 
at the clear expense of the existing creditors. The court also sug-
gested that existing creditors were especially deserving of judicial 
protection because they were vulnerable. Unlike subsequent vol-
untary creditors who presumably could protect themselves from 
undesirable LBOs, the creditors in this case had no such opportu-
nity. Is? 
Judicial reluctance to protect shareholders at the expense of 
creditors manifests itself in other ways as well. Two such manifes-
tations are notable here, both of which involve the "unreasonably 
small capital" standard of fraudulent transfer liability. Some courts 
hold that a debtor's pledging of all its assets per se establishes a 
debtor's "unreasonably small capital."188 This view assumes that a 
debtor's lack of unencumbered assets precludes the debtor from 
obtaining additional credit.189 An all-encompassing pledge undoubt-
185 Gleneagles, 565 F. Supp at 565, 572. 
186 Id. at 564-65. The court found that prior to the LBO, Target had an unflattering 
financial condition. Its coal production business was generally unprofitable. Indeed, in the 
five year period before the LBO, it operated at a loss and was frequently delinquent in the 
payment of real estate taxes and trade accounts. Most of its cash flow was generated by the 
sale of surplus lands. !d. at 564, 579. The LBO lender was aware of the poor state of Target's 
finances and made various arrangements for repayment of principal and interest. 
187 See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1297 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). The major creditors in this case were "involuntary,'' 
in that they did not become creditors by virtue of a contract. Even if they had been contract 
creditors, however, they could not have protected themselves from the adverse consequences 
of the LBO because they became creditors before LBOs became a popular method of 
financing corporate acquisitions. !d. 
188 See supra text accompanying notes 140-54 for a discussion of cases holding that a 
debtor with insufficient unencumbered assets is unreasonably capitalized. 
189 See, e.g., Pirrone v. Toboroff (In re Vaniman Int'l Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 186 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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edly makes additional financing difficult or even impossible if one 
assumes that secured financing is the only way a debtor can raise 
needed cash to operate a business. But secured financing is only 
one method to obtain credit. It by no means exhausts the universe 
of credit sources. · 
A business may raise equity capital from existing or new own-
ers.190 It may obtain additional financing from an existing secured 
lender or a new lender if the former is willing to subordinate its 
lien or debt. 191 Most importandy, a fully encumbered business may 
be able to generate sufficient cash flow from its operations to con-
tinue in business.192 Thus, although unencumbered assets are im-
portant to a business's continued viability, they are not determina-
tive. 
Nevertheless, courts repeatedly condemn as fraudulent trans-
fers the security interests that selling shareholders retain in the 
assets of the corporation they own.193 In these bootstrap acquisi-
tions, the selling shareholders finance the buyer's acquisition by 
accepting the buyer's note for a significant portion of the purchase 
price.194 The buyer then uses the purchased corporation's assets to 
secure its note. 
It is this type of transaction that In re College Chemists and its 
progeny condemns. These courts conclude that the transaction 
leaves the company's future ability to carry on business "on an 
expectancy of profit."195 The creditors' ability to be repaid likewise 
190 See, e.g., Allied Products Corp. v. Arrow Freightways, Inc., 104 N.M. 544, 545, 724 
P.2d 752, 753 (1986). Allied Products involved an LBO financed by the selling shareholders 
in which the new owner invested additional equity capital, personally guaranteed some 
$250,000 of Target's debts to third parties and renegotiated the terms of another major 
debt. I d. See Markell, Toward True and Plain Dealing: A Theory of Fraudulent Transfers Involving 
Unreasonably Small Capital, 21 IND. L. REv. 469, 490 (1988) (criticizing the view that equates 
total encumbrance of a company's assets with unreasonable capitalization). 
191 Markell, supra note 190, at 490. 
192 See Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 183-84 (C.D. Cal. 1985) 
(giving decisive importance to future cash flow from operations in determining whether 
Target is reasonably capitalized); Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 
(D.N.J. 1984) (reasonable expectation of improvement in business conditions negates negative 
inference from the excess of liabilities over assets); see also Carlson, supra note 3, at 95 ("What 
is necessary is a cash flow that exceeds costs of operation, including the cost of servicing 
outstanding debt.") (citing Lopucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/ 
Bankruptcy Systems, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 327). 
195 See Pirrone v. Toboroff (In re Vaniman lnt'l, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 181 (E.D.N.Y. 
1982). These interests are known as "bootstrap acquisitions." 
194 Smyser, supra note 9, at 788. 
195 See supra notes 138-50 and accompanying text. Professor Glenn quotes a judge who 
described the thought process of someone carrying business "on the expectancy of a profit" 
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rests on the company's expectancy of profit. Although selling share-
holders remain safe because they hold a security interest in all the 
assets of their former company, these courts apparently find it 
fundamentally unfair to allow shareholders to retain a position of 
safety while creditors are exposed to possible loss.196 It is little 
wonder then that the analysis of Target's capital is either skimpy or 
non-existent in these opinions. All too often the court glibly con-
cludes that the debtor's pledging of all of its assets is ipso facto 
"unreasonably small capital."197 Under this logic, a bootstrap acqui-
sition is inevitably invalid per se unless it succeeds or unless somehow 
adequate provisions exist for creditors by, for example, reducing 
the level of leverage.198 Without such provisions, a selling share-
holder of a failed bootstrap acquisition may find it difficult to per-
suade a court, after the fact, that a challenged transfer should not 
"shock its conscience."199 
as follows: "The grantor virtually says, If I succeed in business, I make a fortune for myself. 
If I fail, I leave my creditors unpaid." 1 G. GLENN, supra note 8, § 334, at 579; see also In re 
Vaniman Int'l Inc., 22 Bankr. at 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding significant the fact that the 
buyer of Target was "a penniless young man with nothing to lose"). 
196 See Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert .View Bldg. Supplies, Inc. (In re Desert View Bldg. 
Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D. Nev. 1978). In In re Atlas Foundry Co., 155 F. 
Supp. 615, 616 (D.N.J. 1957), the trustee in bankruptcy framed the question for the court 
in a manner suggesting the unfairness of preferring shareholders to creditors, as follows: 
"May stockholders of a corporation through use of a fictitious consideration, obtain a mort-
gage on the realty of the corporation as part consideration for the sale of their shares of 
stock in the corporation?" Although the corporation was cash rich and was not insolvent at 
the time of the buyout, the court declared the mortgage invalid. 
197 See supra notes 140-53 for a discussion of cases holding that a debtor with insufficient 
unencumbered assets is unreasonably capitalized. But see Armstrong Co. v. Limperis (In re 
Process-Manz Press, Inc.), 236 F. Supp. 333, 346 (N.D. III. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 369 
F.2d 513, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967) (finding unreasonably 
small capital from evidence of inability to pay debts, an increase of debt, and bank overdrafts, 
all after the challenged transaction); Allied Products Corp. v. Arrow Freightways, Inc., 104 
N.M. 544, 545, 724 P.2d 752, 753 (1986) (in finding reasonable capitalization, court consid-
ered that buyer had invested substantial additional equity, personally guaranteed Target's 
debts, renegotiated on other debt, and doubled its gross revenue, all after the transaction). 
198 See Allied Products, 104 N.M. at 545, 724 P.2d at 753 (indicating some of the ways in 
which adequate provisions for creditors may be made). 
199 See id. at 548, 724 P.2d at 756. Allied Products indicates the circumstances in which a 
court is unlikely to find that the LBO left Target with unreasonably small capital. The court 
acknowledged that the transaction "made future financing difficult, if not impossible." Id. 
Nevertheless, it rejected the creditors' claims that the transaction left Target with unreason-
ably small capital. It did suggest that "[i]t does seem unfair, in retrospect, that [shareholders] 
should be peTIIlitted to retain all the proceeds of [Target's] liquidation, while these [creditors] 
go unsatisfied." Id. The court, however, refused to find the transaction "unconscionable" or 
"grossly inequitable" to "the degree of'shocking the conscience of the court.'" Id. In reaching 
that conclusion, the court considered the fact that Target had operated successfully for a 
year after the transaction, during which time the buyer "injected" into Target $100,000 of 
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A similar perception of unfairness. to creditors seemingly un-
derlies the view of those courts that find "unreasonably small capi-
tal" if they find insolvency. Equating insolvency with "unreasonably 
small capital" has significant consequences. Fraudulent transfer law 
distinguishes between two groups of creditors: existing and subse-
quent. Only existing creditors may invalidate transfers made by a 
debtor who was insolvent or rendered insolvent as a result of the 
transfer.200 On the other hand, both existing and subsequent cred-
itors may invalidate transfers that leave a debtor with "unreasonably 
small capital."201 Thus, a court that equates insolvency with "unrea-
sonably small capital" permits subsequent creditors to invalidate 
transfers based on a showing of financial condition that the statutory 
scheme suggests was only intended to protect existing creditors. 
Several courts have blurred, if not ignored, these distinctions 
to permit subsequent creditors to invalidate transfers on the basis 
of insolvency.202 For example, in Spanier v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co.,203 the company's stockholders acquired a security interest in 
the company's assets as part of a bootstrap acquisition. The court 
concluded that the transaction rendered the company insolvent204 
and that the company was also unreasonably capitalized,205 thereby 
opening the door for subsequent creditors to invalidate the security 
interest. 
If a showing of insolvency satisfies the standard of "unreason-
ably small capital," the distinction between existing al)d subsequent 
his own money, personally guaranteed $250,000 of Target's debts to third parties, renego-
tiated a $75,000 debt, and substantially increased its revenue. Id. at 545, 548, 724 P.2d at 
753,756. 
200 UFCA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1985); UFTA, § 5, 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985); see, e.g., TWM 
Homes, Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Inv. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 887, 896, 214 Cal. App. 2d 826, 
843 (1963). The Bankruptcy Code, however, has eliminated the distinction between existing 
and future creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988); S. RlESENFELD, CREDITORS' REM-
EDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 659-60 (4th ed. 1987). 
2°1 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988); UFCA § 5, 7A U.L.A. 504; UFTA § 4, 7A U.L.A. 
652-53. 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Invest. Co., ,565 F. Supp. 556, 580 (M.D. Pa. 
1983), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1980); New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. 
v. Adler, 2 Bankr. 752, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76 Bankr. 
523, 529 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987); Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re Louisiana 
Indus. Coatings, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 688, 695, 698 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1983); Spanier v. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 594, 623 P.2d 19, 24 (Ct. App. 1980). 
2os 127 Ariz. 589, 623 P.2d 19 (1980). 
204 Id. at 592, 623 P.2d at 22. 
2os Id. at 594, 623 P.2d at 24. 
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creditors becomes irrelevant. 206 According to one commentator, it 
also contradicts the rationale for the distinction. According to the 
latter, the insolvency branch of fraudulent transfer law only protects 
existing creditors because it assumes subsequent creditors can in-
vestigate their debtor's financial condition at the time of the trans-
action. 207 Although the Spanier court did not explicitly engage in a 
balancing analysis weighing the equities between selling sharehold-
ers and creditors, the court's disregard of the statute's plain lan-
guage indicates its discomfort with transactions that allow share-
holders to liquidate their investments without making adequate 
provisions for creditors, even subsequent ones. As with transactions 
in which the debtor encumbers all of its assets for the benefit of 
shareholders, the court may view the insolvent debtor as carrying 
on its business on "an expectancy of profit/' thereby unfairly shift-
ing its risks to creditors. 2os 
B. Limiting the Impact of Fraudulent Transfer Law to Protect LBO 
Participants 
Other courts have not relied on a debtor's lack of unencum-
bered assets209 or net worth210 as the essential predicate for a finding 
206 This argument failed to persuade the Spaneir court. In its view, the proper distinction 
is between business and personal creditors. See id. at 594-95, 623 P.2d at 24-25. According 
to the court, the insolvency standard protects existing personal creditors whereas the unrea-
sonably small capital provision protects only business creditors, existing as well as future.Id. 
The court also held that the unreasonably small capital standard requires a lesser showing 
than insolvency, thereby allowing business creditors to avoid a transfer that did not render 
the debtor insolvent. See id. The court's interpretation clearly favors business creditors over 
personal ones. There is little however, in the statute to support it. 
207 Markell, supra note 190, at 492 n.160 (citing Crumbaugh v. Kugler, 2 Ohio St. 374, 
379 (1854)) (subsequent creditors "give credit to their debtor as he is-for what he has, not 
for what he once had"). Cf P. Alces, supra note 14, 11 5.02[2][a], at 5-52 ("As a practical 
matter, financially speaking, the difference between insolvency and having unreasonably 
small capital is not of great consequence."). 
208 See Pirrone v. Toboroff (In re Vaniman Int'l Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 186, 188 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1982) (debtor's insoivency left it with no capital, casting the hazards of its business 
on creditors); White v. Coon (In re Purco, Inc.), 76 Bankr. 523, 528 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) 
(suggesting that it is unfair for shareholders to retain security interests in their own corpo-
ration while creditors take the risk). But see Cate v. Nicley (In re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 
F. Supp. 567, 572 (E.D. Tem).. 1979) ("Although defendant, as president [and sole stock-
holder], did grant a security interest to himself, the new owner, [buyer], assented to the 
transfers as part of an arms-length transaction in which the buyer was under no compulsion 
to buy. There was no special relationship between [buyer] and defendant."). 
209 See, e.g., Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 186 (C.D. Cal. 
1985) (considering cash flow); Allied Products Corp. v. Arrow Freightways, Inc., 104 N.M. 
544, 548, 724 P.2d 752, 756 (1986) (considering ability to finance future operations). 
210 Telefest, Inc. v. VU-TV, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1368, 1376 (D.N.J. 1984); see also Barret 
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of "unreasonably small capital." Indeed, some of these courts seem 
to exhibit some basic discomfort with the application of fraudulent 
transfer law to LBOs. 211 Two factors seem to explain this judicial 
quietude. 
First, LBOs involve an outside and presumably independent 
third party who finances the LBO. Generally, the third party lender 
views its involvement in an LBO as a normal incident of its business. 
Unlike the selling shareholders in a bootstrap acquisition, the third 
party lender has no relationship to Target. Therefore, judicial sus~ 
picion of self-dealing and purposive disregard of creditor rights is 
presumptively unlikely, provided the lender has taken appropriate 
precautions to satisfy itself of Target's financial viability.212 
Second, the LBO lender parts with significant amounts of funds 
in exchange for the security interests it acquires in Target's assets. 
In contrast, selling shareholders in a bootstrap acquisition acquire 
security interests in exchange for shares of the corporation. Neither 
lender's funds nor the shares of the corporation are of any value 
to Target itself and, from Target's point of view then, there is no 
difference. Nevertheless, a difference exists in terms of the equities 
of the parties to the transaction. The lender, a creditor, in the tBO 
competes with other creditors. In the bootstrap scenario, share-
holders (owners) compete with creditors. Upholding a bootstrap 
acquisition would prefer equity interests to creditor interests, a 
result that courts are reluctant to reach.213 
v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 882 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (declining to rely on 
"technical" insolvency as proof of unreasonable capitalization because of "the risk of ascribing 
undue weight to the state of a company's balance sheet on a particular day"). The Barret 
court believed that the proper approach to "unreasonably small capital" requires a court to 
examine a company's capital "throughout a reasonable period of time surrounding the precise 
date of a challenged transfer." I d. 
211 See, e.g., Kupetz v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 77 Bankr. 754, 760 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987); Credit Managers Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. at 179-81; Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, 
Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 430, 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
212 See Credit Managers Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. at 183, 184 (finding third party lender's cash 
flow analysis as proof of financial viability); In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 Bankr. at 438 
(giving "presumptive validity" to Target's balance sheet prepared according to GAAP because 
the court "felt that participants in an LBO must be protected from the perfect hindsight 
often evidenced in creditors' subsequent attack on the corporate buyout"). 
21s In re Vaniman Int'l Inc., 22 Bankr. 166, 181 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (placing cor-
porate assets where insiders can reach them but where creditors cannot is precisely the type 
of conduct fraudulent transfer law is designed to prohibit). As Professor Clark notes, the 
basic ideal of fraudulent transfer law commands controlling insiders to refrain from acting 
in ways designed to prefer themselves at the expense of creditors. Clark, supra note 6, at 510 
n.l6. 
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Several courts assert that not every creditor evokes or deserves 
judicial sympathy. Some courts are distinctly uncomfortable if the 
creditors seeking to invalidate the LBO are subsequent creditors.214 
These courts, openly hostile to such creditors, have sought to ex-
clude them from legal protection, even though the statutory pro-
vision regarding "unreasonably small capital" in so many words 
includes subsequent creditors. These courts believe equity and fair-
ness do not permit a subsequent creditor to extend credit willingly 
to Target a~d then to invalidate an LBO if it later fails. Because 
such conduct does not seem to sit well with courts, they have re-
sorted to various devices to contain the impact of fraudulent trans-
fer law on LBOs that the parties enter into in the ordinary course 
of business. 
1. Cash Flow Projections 
Judicial reliance on the cash flow approach as a way to curb 
the impact of fraudulent transfer law on LBOs may not be apparent 
at first blush. The consequences of using such an approach are best 
appreciated if several factors are kept in mind. First, by using cash 
flow to determine Target's financial viability, a court recognizes 
Target's business value as a whole-not the value of its assets, as-
suming they were somehow liquidated. As noted, the liquidation 
approach that relies on the break-up value of Target's assets does 
not and cannot recognize the influences and effects of intangible 
interests that cannot be valued separately from a business. As a 
result, valuing Target's assets on a piecemeal basis, however accu-
rate, cannot satisfactorily measure its ability to pay its debts. 
Equally significant, under the cash flow approach, the court 
determines "unreasonably small capital" as a function of the LBO 
lender's projections. The cash flow method clearly represents a far 
cry from the idea of leviable assets that other approaches empha-
size.215 These other approaches give no value to assets that cannot 
be quickly sold, as Gleneagles well demonstrates.216 Similarly, these 
214 See supra note 211 for cited authorities. 
215 The idea of leviable assets appears to be at the core of the reasoning of courts that 
find unreasonably small capital on finding insolvency or a debtor's pledging of all of its assets. 
216 United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556,577-78 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd 
sub nom. United States v. Tabor Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
107 S. Ct. 3229 (1987); see also Chase Nat'! Bank v. United States Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 
500, 503, 260 N.Y.S. 40, 44 (1932) ("not every asset, but only such as are salable enter the 
equation"). 
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approaches disregard contingent assets.217 As a result, a debtor 
easily could be found insolvent and, for that reason, unreasonably 
capitalized, even though its operation.s could generate sufficient 
cash flow to meet its expected debts. Even when a debtor is not 
insolvent under this standard, its pledging of all its assets may ipso 
facto establish "unreasonably small capital." This approach assumes 
that the wholesale pledge of the debtor's estate leaves no assets from 
which creditors may satisfy their claims. Under this approach, vir-
tually every LBO will be fraudulent.218 In contrast, under the cash 
flow method, LBO participants are protected from fraudulent 
transfer liability as long as the LBO lender makes a reasonable, even 
if ultimately incorrect, prediction of Target's financial viability. 
2. Limiting the Scope of Liabilities 
Judicial sensitivity- to the interests of LBO participants, partic-
ularly the LBO lender, and judicial hostility to the equities of sub-
sequent creditors, may express itself in other ways. For example, a 
court can limit the scope of Target's liabilities. In re Ohio Corrugating 
Co.219 is an excellent example of this approach. Traditionally, courts 
have given and applied inclusive scope to the term "liabilities."220 
In addition, in determining whether to include a particular liability 
in the balance sheet, courts have often been reluctant to be bound 
by a debtor's accounting method221 in order to protect creditors 
from debtor fraud. 222 
In Ohio Corrugating, the court disregarded both Target's un-
funded pension liabilities and its environmental clean-up obliga-
tions. 223 Although the court acknowledged that Generally Accepted 
217 See supra note 42 for a discussion of the impact on a debtor's solvency of disregarding 
contingent assets. _ 
218 See Cook & Mendales, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: An Introductory Critique, 
62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 91 (1988) (stating that "a leveraged acquisition that left a corporation 
with little or no unencumbered property would be even more readily subject to attack [under 
the UFTA] than under present law"). The commentators' view is based on the UFTA's 
definition of "assets" as non-exempt property that is not subject to a valid lien. See UFTA 
§ 1(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. 644 (1985). 
219 91 Bankr. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
22o See, e.g., Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 499-500 
(N.D. Cal. 1980); Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wash. App. 864, 515 P.2d 995 (1973) (debt barred by 
limitations). 
221 See, e.g., F.S. Bowen Electric Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 256 F.2d 
46, 49 (4th Cir. 1958); Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp.· (In re Bellanca 
Aircraft Corp.), 56 Bankr. 339, 385 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985). -
222 Tri-Continental Leasing Corp., 485 F. Supp. at 500. 
22s 91 Bankr. at 438, 439. 
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Accounting Principles ("GAAP") do not control what may be in~ 
eluded as a debtor liability, it departed from the acknowledged 
prevailing view by "assign[ing] presumptive validity" to GAAP treat~ 
ment of such liabilities. 224 The court concluded that GAAP was a 
reasonable basis with which to measure includable liabilities on a 
debtor's balance sheet and therefore excluded unfunded pension 
liabilities. 225 The court's reliance on GAAP was curious because it 
turns on its head the policy purpose behind a broad conception of 
liabilities. Far from being a means to protect creditors from con~ 
structive fraud, Ohio Corrugating's restrictive approach virtually ex-
empts all LBOs from attack under the insolvency branch of fraud~ 
ulent transfer law because no reasonable lender would ever finance 
an LBO in which the balance sheet did not meet GAAP standards. 
The court's use of GAAP as a standard is also curious in light of 
prevailing practices in the LBO industry. According to these prac;-
tices, lenders seldom finance an LBO unless they first obtain expert 
opinions assuring them of Target's financial solvency.226 Such expert 
opinions specifically address the impact on a company's solvency of 
off-balance sheet liabilities, such as unfunded pension liabilities and 
environmental clean-up obligations. 227 Based on industry practice, 
it would therefore be unreasonable for an LBO lender to rely on 
GAAP to measure the kinds of liabilities it should consider in as-
sessing Target's financial viability. 
Despite these incongruities, the Ohio Corrugating court's reliance 
on GAAP is not surprising. First, according to the court, it would 
be both unfair and punitive to undo an LBO at the behest of 
subsequent creditors because they willingly extend credit after a 
buyout relying on Target's performance. 228 If fraudulent transfer 
law protects these creditors, the doctrine of constructive fraud 
would serve as a form of insurance. 229 Second, unlike shareholder-
financed acquisitions, the court might have viewed valuation results 
reached by or on behalf of an independent lender as posing little 
224 I d. at 438. 
22s Id. 
226 See Maher & Stewart-Lewis, The Accountant's Substitute for LBO Solvency Letters, MERG-
ERS & ACQUISITIONS, Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 42 (noting the accounting profession's ban on 
solvency letters and lenders' resort to valuation firms for such letters, all in reaction to liability 
under the law of fraudulent transfers). 
227 See VALUATION REsEARCH, Summer 1988, at 3 ("An increasingly important area of 
inquiry (under the balance-sheet test] is that of liabilities that may arise from ... pension 
plan funding ... [and] obligations imposed by the 1980 'Superfund' law."). 
228 In re Ohio Corrugating Co., 91 Bankr. 430, 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
229 See id. 
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threat of self-dealing. The presence of an independent lender might 
signal that the LBO was not intended to defraud creditors. 230 In 
Ohio Corrugating, Target's reconstituted balance sheet showed a def-
icit of $700,000, representing over twenty percent of Target's total 
liabilities. 231 This deficit is a relatively large shortfall and would have 
been even larger if the court had included off-balance sheet liabil-
ities. Nevertheless, according to the court Target was solvent.232 
IV. A SuGGESTED APPROACH TO DETERMINE FINANCIAL 
PRECARIOUSNESS: CASH FLOW 
An LBO stands or falls on an assessment of Target's financial 
condition under two alternative test<s-insolvency and unreasonably 
small capital. The standards to guide such assessment are inherently 
vague and unpredictable. As a result, the critical question under 
these tests is which standard of valuation a court will use to evaluate 
Target's financial condition. For example, a court could determine 
Target's value on the basis of how much its assets will bring if sold 
piecemeal immediately or within a reasonable time. A court could 
also value Target as a going concern, whereby assets would be on 
the basis of their use and contribution to revenue.233 In the LBO 
context, the court's choice of which standard to apply seems to 
depend on its view of the acceptable reach of fraudulent transfer 
law and its assessment of whether Target's creditors were unfairly 
disadvantaged by the LBO. 
This section argues that if Target was a going concern at the 
time of its LBO, it is unreasonable to assess Target's financial con-
dition on the basis of liquidation value, whether the liquidation is 
assumed to occur immediately or within a reasonable time. 234 If 
230 The LBO in Ohio Corrugating Co. was financed by Security Pacific Business Credit, 
Inc., an outside party. The court believed that the lender's and other LBO participants' 
reliance on GAAP was reasonable. I d. at 432, 438. The court also stated that the constructive 
fraud provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988), should be construed to 
require "a small degree of scienter or awareness of fraud." Id. at 439. The court, however, 
found nothing in the LBO participants' intent to "buttress a finding of insolvency." I d. 
2SI Id. 
2s2 In concluding that Target was solvent, the court placed much importance on the 
fact that Target had paid its debts as they matured for a period of ten months after the LBO 
during which trade creditors were paid off six or seven times. I d. at 440. 
233 Generally, going-concern values exceed liquidation values. Fortgang & Mayer, supra 
note 83, at 1064. 
21H Liquidation value, however, should be the governing standard if at the time of the 
LBO, Target was "so close to shutting its doors that a going concern standard [would be] 
unrealistic." Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc.), 100 
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Target was a going concern at the time of its LBO, its solvency or 
capitalization should be determined on the basis of its value as a 
going concern. Under this standard, judicial inquiry should focus 
on whether Target's projected cash flow is sufficient to cover its 
expected debts and the costs of its operation. If the court finds that 
Target's cash flow is positive, then Target should be deemed solvent 
in the balance sheet sense as well as reasonably capitalized. More-
over, in conducting this inquiry, courts should consider, rather than 
dismiss, the claims of subsequent creditors. 
A. Going Concern Value as the Appropriate Standard 
Fraudulent transfer law exists to protect creditors from a debt-
or's fraudulent conduct. The function and standard of valuation 
should therefore relate to this underlying purpose and help deter-
mine creditors' chances of satisfying their claims. 235 The foregoing 
criteria might suggest liquidation as the only valid valuation stan-
dard. After all, the most expedient way to use assets to satisfy a 
debt is to sell them and apply the proceeds to the debt. From this 
distinctively creditor-oriented perspective, it makes perfect sense to 
measure asset value by the proceeds of immediate liquidation or 
liquidation within a reasonable time. Valuation under these stan-
dards is bound to disregard, to a greater or lesser degree, certain 
kinds of illiquid and contingent assets, 236 or assets that cannot be 
sold separately from a business.237 Even though such assets contrib-
ute greatly to the value of a debtor's business, they are disregarded 
because they are not available quickly or within a reasonable time 
for the payment of debts. Further, the fraudulent transfer statutes 
require determination of solvency by weighing the value of a debt-
or's assets against all of its liabilities, irrespective of their maturities 
or contingencies. 
Nonetheless, such a standard is inappropriate. Its effect is to 
extend the reach of fraudulent transfer law in ways that go beyond 
Bankr. 127, 131 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (citing Mitchell v. Investment Sec. Corp., 67 F.2d 
669, 671-72 (5th Cir. 1933); In re Windor Indus., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 270, 276-77 (N.D. Tex. 
1978)). 
235 Vadnais Lumber Supply, 100 Bankr. at 137. The court stated that because fraudulent 
transfer Jaw is designed to protect creditors, the financial condition intended must be related 
in some way to ability to pay debts." Id. 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 52-67 for a discussion of a broad (harsh) approach 
to solvency determination. 
257 See infra text accompanying note 248 for a discussion of non-separable but important 
assests. 
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what is reasonably necessary to protect creditors. An approach of 
this nature assumes that Target's business has no future and that 
therefore its break-up value should determine its ability to pay its 
debts. Similarly, it assumes that Target's long-term debt or install-
ment obligations are immediately due. 238 Such an approach deprives 
Target of the capitalized value of its earnings. Very few businesses 
would be considered solvent under such a standard. 239 
A liquidation approach rests on unrealistic assumptions. In an 
honest LBO, neither seller nor buyer contemplates that·liquidation 
will occur. If Target was a going concern at the time of its LBO, it 
is also unreasonable to assume that the parties expected Target to 
pay its debts by selling its assets. It would be a different case if the 
parties intended to use the LB'O to liquidate Target. Gleneagles may 
have been such a case. 240 In such a case, it would be reasonable to 
determine Target's solvency on a liquidation basis because that was 
how the parties expected Target to pay its debts. Liquidation is the 
only way Target can pay its debts. But where Target is a going 
concern and the parties expected it to survive as such, it is unrea-
sonable to assess Target's ability to pay its debts by selling its assets. 
One can logically assume Target will pay its debts from its earnings. 
After all, "the value of a business lies in its ability to provide a future 
stream of net cash."241 Therefore, a court should determine Target's 
value and. solvency in terms of its capitalized earnings.242 
I d. 
23B See Heiman, supra note 36, at 21-16. Heiman noted: 
The weighing of all future liability against present assets may be unrealistic. It 
is not uncommon today for a company to be successful in its business, productive 
and paying bills as they come due, while carrying a debt that has a total liability 
in excess of the value of its present assets. Such a corporation will be deemed 
insolvent by the insolvency standards of the UFCA and the Bankruptcy Code, 
even though by standards of the modern market place the corporation is doing 
well. 
239 Id.; Vener, supra note 34, at 226. 
240 The Gleneagles court found that the LBO lender and buyer did not expect Target to 
be able to generate sufficient cash flow to cover its debts. United States v. Gleneagles Inv. 
Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 581 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Tabor Realty 
Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1307 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987). Precisely because 
the lender did not expect Target's cash flow to cover interest payment, it created an "interest 
reserve fund" for the purpose of relieving Target of its obligation to pay periodic interest. 
I d. In addition, the loan principal was not amortized, the lender believing that Target "could 
somehow liquidate enough assets to generate the cash needed to pay off the principal." I d. 
at 581-82. 
241 R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS § 11.5, at 233 (1989). 
242 The court in In re Vadnais Lumber Supplies, Inc. indicated a willingness to determine 
solvency on this basis. See In re Vadnais Lumber, 100 Bankr. 127, 132 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
It rejected as fundamentally flawed an accountant's reliance on the values of specific assets 
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Determining solvency by capitalizing earnings or cash flow is 
fair and should give creditors no reasonable cause to complain. If 
Target's cash flow is sufficient to cover all its debts, creditors face 
little or no risk of nonpayment. Creditors do bear such risk if the 
expected cash flow fails to materialize because the cash flow method 
of valuation relies on projections. If a court accepts the projections 
as reasonable, creditors cannot avoid the LBO as fraudulent.243 
Therefore, under the cash flow method, creditors bear the risk of 
loss from unexpected occurrences. Nevertheless, it is not self-evi-
dent why LBO participants should bear the consequences of un-
expected occurrences. If the assumptions underlying Target's cash 
flow projections were reasonable at the time they were made, fraud-
ulent transfer law should not require LBO participants to be placed 
in the position of insuring the LBO's success.244 
Creditors may also object that the cash flow method substitutes 
projections for the leviable assets that a liquidation approach im-
plies. Such an approach, however, would deprive Target of its cap-
italized value and render insolvent a potentially profitable and op-
erating entity, thereby rendering virtually all LBOs per se 
fraudulent. Such a rule that is too protective of creditors to the 
complete detriment of other honest parties is not defensible. As 
some commentators have noted, "[c]omplete deference to creditor 
protection ... makes no more sense than complete deference to 
debtor freedom."245 
to determine Target's value. Id. Despite its willingness to use the capitalization of earnings 
method, however, the court did not actually use this method, apparently because the defen-
dants were unable to show that Target had a net profit to capitalize in view of the losses it 
incurred before and after the challenged transfer. See id. at 132-33. The court also indicated 
that the price paid in an LBO, with necessary adjustments for the value of the LBO transfers, 
would be the "most probative evidence concerning solvency or insolvency." Id. See also Cate 
v. Nicely (In re Knox Kreations), 474 F. Supp. 567, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). The Knox 
Kreations court stated: 
!d. 
The surest sign of the insolvency of a corporation is the worthlessness of its 
stock . ·- . . It is, therefore, critical to note that Topsy Turvy, an arms length 
purchaser, was willing to pay $175,000.00 for 81% of the stock of debtor. Topsy 
Turvy must have felt that the assets of the bankrupt were greater than its 
liabilities. 
245 Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 184 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("The 
question the court must decide is not whether GECC's projection was correct, for it clearly 
was not, but whether it was reasonable and prudent at the time it was made."). 
244 See id. at 187 (court noting that fraudulent transfer does not require Target to be 
"sufficiently well capitalized to withstand any and all setbacks to [its] business"). 
2<s Baird & Jackson, supra note 8, at 836. 
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A liquidation approach is too deferential to creditors. It is also 
likely to curtail or eliminate a debtor's freedom to engage in prof-
itable transactions. Such a standard would not be fair to debtors. 
Few owners would sell a business for its liquidation value. It is also 
important to recall that fraudulent transfer law, including the 
UFCA, requires valuation to be "fair."246 
Finally, liquidation value is at odds with modern lending prac-
tices. LBO lending decisions are made on Target's value as a going 
concern.247 A liquidation approach cannot capture all of Target's 
assets that influence its value and debt-paying ability because assets 
that cannot be liquidated have no liquidation value. Most assets will 
have a liquidation value even though Target ceases to be a going 
concern. Nonetheless, valuable assets such as customer lists, unpa-
tented process technology, and research and development costs will 
have no liquidation value. 248 For this reason lenders rely on Target's 
going concern value in making lending decisions. 249 
Because Target's value lies in its ability to provide a future 
stream of net cash,250 lenders look to its post-LBO cash flow as the 
primary source of repayment. 251 As the Credit Managers court rec-
ognized, balance sheet ratios no longer determine a business's cre-
ditworthiness. Although LBO loans are invariably secured and as-
sets are obviously important, a lender's evaluation of Target's cash 
flow is the decisive factor. 252 Without an acceptable cash flow to 
service the LBO debt and cover the costs of operation, lenders 
would not make a loan in the first place. Therefore, judicial reliance 
on a modern lender's cash flow evaluation to determine debt-paying 
ability would be consistent with fraudulent transfer law's goal of 
creditor protection and would comport with current commercial 
practices. 
246 See American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bone, 333 F.2d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 1964). 
247 See Michel & Shaked, What Every LBO Leru1er Must Know About Valuation, CoM. 
LENDING REv., Spring 1990, at 10, 12. 
248 Cross, supra note 91, at 47 ("While the liquidation value of tangible assets generally 
is less than stated book value, the liquidation value of intangible assets is generally zero, or 
close to zero."). 
249 Id. (noting that for the lender "the most efficient approach may be to value the 
enterprise as a whole."). 
250 R. HAMILTON, supra note 241, § 11.5, at 233. 
251 Cross, supra note 91, at 47. 
252 Credit Mangers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 187 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Cross, 
supra note 91, at 47 ("Traditional credit parameters relating to balance sheet ratios no longer 
are meaningful."). 
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B. Cashflow as the sole test of Financial Precariousness 
Fraudulent transfer law uses "insolvency" and "unreasonably 
small capital" as separate tests of a debtor's debt-paying ability. By 
comparing the present value of assets and liabilities, insolvency 
measures a debtor's present ability to make a gratuitous transfer 
without harming existing creditors. "Unreasonably small capital," a 
broader test, assesses the debtor's ability to pay both existing and 
future debts. 
Although these two tests of financial precariousness are legally 
distinct, the manner in which some courts have recendy applied 
them in the LBO context suggests a synthesis. In In re Vadnais 
Lumber Supply, Inc., the court indicated a willingness to determine 
Target's solvency under a going-concern value standard by a capi-
talization of earnings method.253 The court stated that "[i]f despite 
[Target's] new interest expense and other problems it had the ability 
to generate even a small profit immediately after the closing, any 
capitalization of that profit would indicate the existence of some 
minimal going concern value and therefore solvency."254 Under this 
method, the net profit figure selected to determine Target's capi-
talized value is determined by averaging past earnings, with appro-
priate weighting to reflect current trends. 255 
Another method to determine Target's going concern value 
relies on a discounted cash flow approach.256 Under this approach, 
Target's present value is determined by projecting its cash flows 
over a period of five to eight years (the "forecast period"), and then 
discounting them by the appropriate cost of capital.257 If its cash 
flow during'the forecast period is positive, then under In re Vadnais 
Lumber Supplies, Inc., Target should be solvent. 
The same cash flow projections that determine Target's sol-
vency in the foregoing manner may also be used to determine the 
reasonableness of its capitalization. Credit Managers is instructive in 
this regard. The Credit Managers court held that if Target could 
generate a positive cash flow to meet its future needs, it could not 
be unreasonably capitalized.258 The court did not consider Target's 
25S 100 Bankr. 127, 132 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). 
254 Id. 
255 Id. 
256 !d.; see supra text accompanying notes 104-112 for a discussion of the going-concern 
value approach. 
257 Michel & Shaked, supra note 247, at 12. 
258 629 F. Supp. 175, 183, 188 (C.D. Cal: 1985). 
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present value to determine solvency, apparendy because there were 
no existing creditors who could avoid the LBO on that basis.259 Even 
if there had been unpaid existing creditors, however, the approach 
the court used suggests that its conclusion regarding Target's sol-
vency would have been the same. 
If Target could generate a positive cash flow during the forecast 
period, capitalizing that cash flow would necessarily establish sol-
vency. If Target's cash flow is positive, it is difficult to see logically 
how existing creditors would be hurt by the LBO. Moreover, if 
insolvency ipso facto establishes unreasonably small capital, as several 
courts have held, the converse should also be true: a finding of 
reasonable capitalization should ipso facto establish solvency. Again, 
it is difficult to see logically how a reasonably capitalized business 
can be deemed insolvent except on the basis of liquidation. Target's 
cash flow should be sufficient as a test for determining fraudulent 
transfer liability in an LBO. 
Reliance on cash flow projections as the sole test of an LBO's 
compliance with fraudulent transfer law depends on the integrity 
and reliability of the assumptions underlying the projections. A risk 
arises that LBO participants may engage in optimistic assump-
tions. 26° Consequendy, courts should evaluate rigorously the rea-
sonableness of these assumptions. The most important assumptions 
relate to two basic risks that Target may face during the forecast 
period. 
One risk is the chance of Target's failure as a result of operating 
losses caused by a business decline in the industry of which it is a 
part. Assumptions relating to business risk are often difficult to 
evaluate. Cash flow estimates are affected by key assumptions, such 
as the growth rate of revenues and expenses, capital oudays re-
quired, inflation, and interest rate. 261 Projections of cash flow, how-
ever, which fail to incorporate the effect of worst-case scenarios, 
such as a rise in the interest rate, a slowdown, or an economic 
recession should be unreasonable per se. 262 
The other risk that Target may face during the forecast period 
is the probability of default because Target cannot meet the fixed 
259 Id. at 180 (noting that the attacking creditors did not hold "substantial" claims on 
the date of the LBO). 
260 Id. at 12. Campeau Corporation's purchase of Allied Stores is an example of a LBO 
where "overoptimistic" assumptions were made. I d. at 16. The cash flow projections assumed 
a 9.0% compound growth rate over the forecast period, whereas the growth rate in sales in 
the recent past had been 6.8%. I d. 
261 Michel & Shaked, supra note 247, at 12. 
262 See id. at 15, 17. 
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changes imposed by its capital structure. 263 By definition, the risk 
of default associated with an LBO is high. Therefore, in determin-
ing the reasonableness of the financial risk assumed by Target, 
courts should determine whether the lender performed sensitivity, 
or "what if," analyses to determine the stability of Target's cash flow 
to pay interest and service fixed charges at different combinations 
of debt and equity capitalization. 264 The wider the margin for error, 
the smaller the risk of insolvency and, therefore, the more reason-
able the lender's assumption. Courts should hold it per se unreason-
able, however, for a lender to rely on GAAP as a measure of the 
kind of liabilities it should consider in determining Target's risk of 
insolvency. Because the risk of insolvency is a matter of economics, 
not accounting, such risk should be assessed by including all of its 
potential liabilities, including off-balance sheet liabilities such as 
Target's unfunded pension liabilities.265 Similarly, Target's expected 
cash flow should be sufficient to cover all reasonably foreseeable 
claims, including those of trade creditors. 
C. Unreasonably Small Capital and the Rights of Subsequent Creditors 
Requiring Target's cash flow projections to reflect the claims of 
subsequent creditors conflicts with some recent court decisions. 
These decisions either hold or strongly suggest that subsequent 
creditors cannot attack an LBO because they assumed the risk of 
nonpayment in extending credit to Target with knowledge of its 
LB0.266 
Denying legal protection to post-LBO creditors is not self-evi-
dent. As a purely technical matter, the fraudulent transfer statutes 
do not support it. Nothing in these statutes conditions a creditor's 
standing to challenge a transfer on a showing that it did not know 
of the LBO or did not assume the risk of its failure.267 An unpaid 
subsequent creditor is merely required to show that Target made a 
gratuitous transfer without adequately providing for subsequent 
creditors. The fraudulent transfer statutes impose the duty of com-
265 Stacey, Asset-Based Loans in Leveraged Buyouts, J. CoM. BANK LENDING, May 1983, at 
55. 
264 See Michel & Shaked, supra note 247, at 13 (noting that lenders often perform 
.~nsitivity analysis with "less than appropriate care and diligence"). 
26s Mavredakis & Greene, supra note 134, at 70. 
266 See supra text accompanying note 211 for a discussion of judicial discomfort in 
applying constructive fraud to protect subsequent creditors. 
267 See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988); UFCA § 5 7A U.L.A. 504 (1985); UITA § 4 7A U.L.A. 
652-55 '1985). 
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plying with the requisite financial condition on Target, regardless 
of a creditor's knowledge. The statutes impose no duty on such 
creditors to investigate a debtor's financial condition, perhaps be-
cause debtor is in the best position to assess its financial condition 
and appreciate the effect of a gratuitous transfer on its financial 
viability. The apparent incongruity, however, of remedying a sub-
sequent creditor's injury at the expense of the LBO lender, an 
innocent third party, has given some courts pause. 
When a court avoids an LBO at the behest of a subsequent 
creditor because the transaction does not satisfy the "unreasonably 
small capital" requirement, lender, not Target, bears the conse-
quences of avoidance-invalidation of its security interests. It might 
seem inequitable to penalize the lender for Target's breach of its 
duty of maintaining reasonable capital for the protection of its 
creditors. Arguably, the lender should bear the brunt of invalidation 
rather than denying subsequent creditors any form of protection. 268 
The lender in an LBO is, or should be seen as, a "gatekee-
per."269 Although the lender is not the primary author or beneficiary 
of Target's misconduct, it is the major supplier of financing and 
therefore is in the best position to avoid violation of the law.270 In 
making its lending decision, a lender typically relies on a solvency 
opinion addressing the viability of Target's financial condition. 
Thus, if a lender is unsatisfied with Target's financial condition, it 
can withdraw from the LBO transaction or require the participants 
to adjust their terms so as to reduce Target's risk of insolvency.271 
Moreover, the lender is the least cost determiner of Target's 
financial situation. As a financial creditor, it possesses the greatest 
degree of specialization in appraising credit risk.272 It also has the 
greatest incentive to investigate Target's creditworthiness. Although 
some subsequent creditors, particularly trade creditors, are also 
268 The problems of risk allocation inherent in avoiding a lender's security interests 
because of "inadequate consideration" are discussed in McCoid, supra note 17, at 658-63. 
269 The term originates from Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party En-
forcement Strategy, 2 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 53, 53 (1986). A gatekeeper is a party who, although 
not the primary author or beneficiary of misconduct, has the ability to prevent it. I d. 
270 Because the lender provides a major portion of the financing for the LBO, the 
transaction cannot be completed without its blessing. If the lender determines that the LBO 
is too highly priced, it can easily cause the deal to fall through by withdrawing from the 
transaction. 
271 Sherwin, supra note 6, at 493. 
272 The general approach of differentiating among types of creditors in terms of their 
information costs is discussed in Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 499, 522-23 (1976). 
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"professional" creditors, the cost to them of investigating Target's 
financial situation will be relatively high. Unlike the lender, they 
have no role whatsoever in the LBO transaction. In addition, they 
have less incentive to investigate because the amount of their credit 
is relatively small. 
Some courts might differentiate among subsequent creditors 
on the basis of creditor knowledge of the LBO, denying protection 
to those who had such knowledge.273 But mere knowledge of the 
LBO does not place subsequent creditors in the position to assess 
fully and appreciate the risks associated with the LBO. It would be 
a different matter if they extended credit after being fully informed 
of the details of the transaction. Absent such knowledge, it seems 
unfair for LBO participants to pass on the risks of the LBO to those 
from whom they expect credit. They know that the LBO's success 
depends on the availability to trade credit. Therefore, it seems only 
fair to hold them responsible for risks that they created. 
Moreover, LBO participants would be liable only if they failed 
to act reasonably in estimating Target's cash flow, not if their pro-
jections proved incorrect. Liability under such a standard is a far 
cry from making them the insurers of the LBO's success. Further-
more, a rule that excluded from protection subsequent creditors 
with knowledge of the LBO is unlikely to serve the best interests of 
the lender or other LBO participants. Such a rule might discourage 
trade creditors from dealing with Target except on a cash-only basis, 
which could deprive Target of needed sources of trade credit and 
exacerbate its cash flow problems. LBO participants would not nec-
essarily embrace such a rule. 
Even if the rule did not discourage extensions of trade credit, 
it would arguably increase the costs of such credit. Trade creditors 
might offer smaller amounts of credit, or require larger down pay-
ments, shorter payoff periods, or higher rates of interest, 274 all 
calculated to minimize the impact of a rule denying them recourse 
if they know about an LBO and extended credit to that LBO. Again, 
any of these adjustments would be unlikely to help Target's cash 
flow. 
Finally, denying subsequent creditors standing to challenge an 
LBO is at odds with the usual approach in bankruptcy proceedings, 
273 See, e.g., Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 Bankr. 
430, 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988). 
274 For example, in Credit Managers Association v. Federal Co., trade creditors "demanded 
quicker payment" from Target. 629 F. Supp. 175, 180 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
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which treats all creditors on a collective, aggregated basis.275 Under 
well-established doctrine,276 the existence of one creditor with the 
right of avoidance is sufficient for the trustee in bankruptcy to 
overturn the LBO for the benefit of all creditors. 277 
V. CONCLUSION 
An LBO stands or falls based on an assessment of Target's 
financial condition. The process of determining financial conditions 
is far less objective than it might appear. The standards to guide 
such assessment are vague and unpredictable. As a result, judicial 
assessment of Target's financial condition is subject to the court's 
view regarding the acceptable reach of fraudulent transfer law. 
A court's evaluation of Target's financial condition also reflects 
its conclusion whether unsecured creditors or LBO participants 
should more fairly assume losses arising from a failed LBO. Courts 
more solicitous of creditors, particularly creditors holding claims at 
the time of an LBO, are more likely to employ a liquidation ap-
proach. Conversely, courts that entertain serious reservations about 
applying constructive fraud to an LBO are likely to approach issues 
of valuation from a going concern perspective or in other ways that 
limit fraudulent transfer law's impact. Some courts simply exclude 
subsequent trade creditors from protection. 
Fraudulent transfer law exists to protect creditors. Valuation 
under it should relate to this underlying purpose. From the stand-
point of protecting creditors, judicial invocation of a liquidation 
standard may appear justified. Such a standard is inappropriate, 
however, because it determines a business's debt-paying ability based 
on a sale of its assets. An ongoing business pays its debts out of 
earnings, not the sale of individual assets. 
Target's cash flow measures its debt-paying ability and its value 
as a going concern. As a result, evaluation of Target's cash flow best 
accommodates the need to protect both creditors and the reasonable 
commercial expectations of participants in an LBO. Its cash flow 
should sufficiently measure an LBO's compliance with fraudulent 
transfer law. If Target's future cash flow is positive, then it should 
be deemed solvent in the balance sheet sense as well as reasonably 
capitalized. 
275 See Posner, supra note 272, at 523. 
276 284 u.s. 4 (1931). 
277 Queenan, supra note 6, at 7, 23. 
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Target's cash flow projections, however, should be carefully 
evaluated to determine the reasonableness of the assumptions upon 
which they are made. It is not reasonable to assume the cost of debt 
will not vary over the forecast period. Moreover, it is not reasonable 
to rely on Target's balance sheet, even one prepared according to 
GAAP, to measure all of Target's potential liabilities. Finally, it is 
not reasonable to omit considerations of subsequent trade creditors 
and to fail to make adequate provisions to satisfy their claims. 
